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Abstract
We give a protocol for producing certifiable randomness from a single untrusted quantum device
that is polynomial-time bounded. The randomness is certified to be statistically close to uniform from
the point of view of any computationally unbounded quantum adversary, that may share entanglement
with the quantum device. The protocol relies on the existence of post-quantum secure trapdoor claw-free
functions, and introduces a new primitive for constraining the power of an untrusted quantum device. We
show how to construct this primitive based on the hardness of the learning with errors (LWE) problem,
and prove that it has a crucial adaptive hardcore bit property. The randomness protocol can be used as
the basis for an efficiently verifiable “test of quantumness”, thus answering an outstanding challenge in
the field.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we propose solutions to two basic tasks: how to generate certifiably random strings from a
single untrusted quantum device (also referred to as a prover), and how to efficiently verify that an untrusted
device is “truly” quantum, as opposed to classical. The setting we consider is one where the quantum device
is polynomial-time bounded but untrusted, and the verifier is entirely classical and also polynomial-time
bounded. The peculiarity of this setting is that it allows the verifier to leverage post-quantum cryptography,
i.e. the existence of cryptographic primitives that can be implemented efficiently on a classical computer
but that cannot be broken by any efficient quantum computer.
There has been considerable research into certifiable random number expansion from quantum de-
vices [Col06, PAM+10, VV11, MS16, AFDF+18], including experimental demonstrations [BKG+18].
However, all prior works providing verifiable guarantees have focused on the setting where there are multi-
ple quantum devices that share entanglement, and where the randomness certification relies on the violation
of a Bell inequality. More generally, the violation of Bell inequalities provides a powerful technique for
the classical testing of quantum devices — the obvious downside being that it is limited to situations with
multiple non-communicating quantum devices that share entanglement. Here we propose a new setting for
classical testing, where bounds on the computational power of a single quantum device are leveraged by
a classical verifier. Specifically, in the context of certifiable random number expansion, the guarantee we
seek is that provided the device is unable to break the post-quantum cryptographic assumption during the
execution of the protocol, the output of the protocol must be statistically indistinguishable from a uniformly
random sequence of bits to any computationally unbounded adversary that may share prior entanglement
with the computationally bounded device. This information-theoretic guarantee, the same guarantee as that
offered in the aforementioned works [VV11, MS16, AFDF+18], is stronger than computational pseudoran-
domness (that is easily achievable under standard cryptographic assumptions, since the verifier starts with a
short uniformly random seed).
The specific cryptographic primitive we rely on is the existence of a post-quantum secure trapdoor claw-
free (in short, TCF) family of functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m , the post-quantum analogue of a notion
introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest in the context of digital signatures [GMR84]. A TCF is a 2-to-
1 function f that satisfies the following properties: f (x) is efficiently computable on a classical computer,
and if f (x) = y, then there is a unique x′ 6= x such that f (x′) = y. Moreover, with knowledge of a secret
trapdoor it is possible to efficiently (classically) compute x and x′ from y, but without the trapdoor there is
no efficient quantum algorithm that can compute such a claw, a triple (x, x′, y), for any y.
By contrast, a quantum algorithm can simultaneously hold an image y, as well as a superposition
1√
2
(|x〉 + |x′〉) over two preimages of y, simply by evaluating f on a uniform superposition over all in-
puts and measuring the image y. At this point, measuring the quantum state in the standard basis will yield
a random preimage, x or x′. This is not any stronger than a classical device could do, by first sampling a
random x and then computing y = f (x). However, the quantum device can do something different from
directly measuring a preimage. Instead, the device can perform Fourier sampling (Hadamard transform
followed by a measurement), which yields a random n-bit string d such that d · (x ⊕ x′) = 0, thereby re-
vealing some joint information about both preimages of y. From the point of view of the classical verifier
a device that performs these tasks is modeled as an untrusted black box that outputs y, and then either a
string x or a string d. Assuming the verifier knows the secret trapdoor, given y she can efficiently compute
both preimages x and x′ and verify that indeed d · (x ⊕ x′) = 0. At a high level, the consideration of a
cryptographic primitive equipped with a trapdoor restores some symmetry between the quantum prover (the
untrusted quantum device) and the classical verifier, by providing a primitive which allows the quantum
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capabilities of the prover to play a useful role while at the same time giving the classical verifier a handle,
namely the ability to compute both x and x′, that the prover does not have access to.
A test of quantumness. We refer to the protocol that consists of first, requesting a value y in the range of
f , and then, executing either the preimage test (receive a string x and check that f (x) = y), or the equation
test (receive a string d and check, using the trapdoor, that d · (x⊕ x′) = 0, where x, x′ are the two preimages
of y), each chosen with probability 12 , as the single round test.
The ability to succeed in the single round test seems to be a unique quantum capability. To argue that
no classical procedure could succeed in the test, we describe a TCF construction based on the learning
with errors problem (LWE) that has additional security guarantees, most notably the “adaptive hardcore bit”
property that is explained below. For clarity, in this paper we refer to the specific kind of TCF that we rely
on as an NTCF, or post-quantum secure noisy trapdoor claw-free family. We give a construction of an NTCF
that rests on the hardness of the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem, introduced by Regev [Reg05], with
slightly super-polynomial noise ratio, against quantum polynomial-time attacks with nonuniform quantum
advice (for which the state of the art classical and quantum attacks scale exponentially with the dimension).
This construction is similar to the one used in [Mah17a], albeit with some changes in parameters that allows
us to prove the following crucial adaptive hardcore bit property: roughly, that given the public parameters of
the NTCF it is computationally intractable to sample from any distribution on quadruples (y, x, d, b) such
that both conditions f (x) = y and b = d · (x⊕ x′) hold with probability non-negligibly larger than 12 . Very
informally, this says that the condition that no efficient quantum algorithm can exhibit a claw (x, x′, y) for
the NTCF can be greatly strengthened to assert that no efficient quantum algorithm can even exhibit (x, y)
and a nontrivial advantage in guessing any generalized bit of x′ of its choice — where a generalized bit is
d · x′ for any choice of d. Note that this is much stronger than a standard hardcore bit, which would assert
intractability only for fixed d.
Assuming such an adaptive hardcore bit property, it is possible to show that passing the single round
test constitutes a proof of quantumness of the device. This is because any efficient classical algorithm that
can reliably succeed in both the preimage test and the equation test could be “rewound” to simultaneously
answer both challenges, thus contradicting the adaptive hardcore bit property.
This result has implications for an important milestone in the experimental realization of quantum com-
puters, namely “quantum supremacy”: a proof that an (untrusted) quantum computing device performs some
computational task that cannot be solved classically without impractical resources. While this could in prin-
ciple be achieved by demonstrating quantum factoring, the latter requires quantum resources well beyond
the capability of near term experiments. Instead current proposals are based on sampling problems (see
e.g. [HM17] for a recent survey). The major challenge for these proposals is verifying that the quantum
computer did indeed sample from the desired probability distribution, and all existing proposals rely on
exponential time classical algorithms for verification. By contrast, our single round test provides a proof of
quantumness that can be verified by a classical verifier in polynomial time. This proposal seems promising
from a practical viewpoint — indeed, even using off-the-shelf bounds for LWE-based cryptography sug-
gests that a protocol providing 50 bits of security could be implemented with a quantum device of around
2000 qubits (see e.g. [LP11]). It would be worth exploring whether there are clever implementations of this
scheme that can lead to a protocol in the 200− 500 qubit range. Our protocol is robust to a device that only
successfully answers the verifier’s challenges with a sufficiently large, but constant, success probability; it
would be interesting to explore whether such a device could be implemented without resorting to general
fault-tolerance techniques.
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Certifiable randomness. The challenge in achieving certifiable randomness lies in using computational
assumptions to establish not pseudorandomness, but rather that the output of the protocol must be (close to)
statistically random. The goal of the protocol we sketch below is to leverage the properties of the NTCF to
characterize the quantum state and measurements of the untrusted quantum device — essentially showing
that it must have a qubit initialized in state |+〉, which it measured in the standard basis, thus generating
statistical randomness. This is the analogue of the use of the violation of Bell inequalities to characterize
the state of the device in entanglement-based testing.
We first explain how to show a device that succeeds in the single round test must generate randomness. In
the test the device must make one of two measurements: either a “preimage” measurement, or an “equation”
measurement. We focus on a single bit of information provided by each measurement. The “preimage”
measurement can be treated as a projection into one of two orthogonal subspaces corresponding to the two
preimages x, x′ for the element y that the device has returned to the verifier. The “equation” measurement
can similarly be coarse-grained into a projection on one of two orthogonal subspaces, “valid” or “invalid”,
i.e. the subspace that corresponds to all measurement outcomes d such that d · (x⊕ x′) = 0, or the subspace
associated with outcomes d such that d · (x⊕ x′) = 1.
Applying Jordan’s lemma, it is possible to decompose the device’s Hilbert space into a direct sum of
one- and two-dimensional subspaces, such that within each two-dimensional subspace the “preimage” and
“equation” measurements each correspond to an orthonormal basis, such that the two bases make a certain
angle with each other. We argue that almost all angles must be very close to π/4. Indeed, whenever the
angles are not near-maximally unbiased, it is possible to show that by considering the effect of performing
the measurements in sequence, one can devise an “attack” on the NTCF of a kind that contradicts the
adaptive hardcore bit property of the NTCF — informally, the attack can simultaneously produce a valid
preimage and a valid equation, with non-negligible advantage.
As a result it is possible to show that the state and (coarse-grained) measurements of the device are, up
to a global change of basis, close to the following: the device starts with a qubit initialized to |+〉, which it
measures in the standard basis for the case of a preimage test and in the Hadamard basis for the case of an
equation test. The fact that an efficient quantum device cannot break the cryptographic assumption has thus
been translated into a characterization of the state and actions of the quantum device, which further implies
that the output of the device in the single round test must contain close to a bit of true (information theoretic)
randomness.
One might further conjecture that for a generic TCF (e.g. modeled as a random oracle), if the output of
any efficient quantum device passes the single round test with non-negligible advantage over 12 , then the pair
y, d returned in the equation test must have high min-entropy. Such a strong statement would immediately
yield a randomness certification protocol. Among the many difficulties in showing such a statement is that
both y and d may be adaptively and adversarially chosen — in the single round protocol above this issue is
addressed by the adaptive hardcore bit property of the NTCF.
Outline of randomness generation protocol. Going beyond the analysis of the single round test requires
significantly more work. So far we have argued that if an efficient quantum algorithm has the ability to gen-
erate a valid equation with probability sufficiently close to 1, then, if instead it is asked for a preimage, this
preimage must be close to uniformly distributed over the two possibilities. To leverage this our randomness
expansion protocol proceeds in multiple rounds, repeatedly asking for new images y and a preimage of y (to
generate randomness) while inserting a few randomly located equation tests to test the device. Each time
an “equation” challenge has been answered, we refresh the pseudorandom keys used for the NTCF. This is
required to avoid a simple “attack” by the device, which would repeatedly use the same y, preimage x, and
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guessed equation d — succeeding in the protocol with probability 12 without generating any randomness.
Let’s call the sequence of rounds with a particular set of pseudorandom keys an epoch. Intuitively, we
would like to claim that if the device passes all the equation tests, then for most epochs and for most rounds
within that epoch, the state of the device and its measurements must be (close to) as characterized above:
it starts with a qubit initialized to |+〉, which it measures in the standard basis for the case of a preimage
test, and in the Hadamard basis for the case of an equation test. To show this we would like to claim that if
the device passes all the equation tests, for most such tests it must produce a valid equation with probability
close to 1. Since each equation test occurs at a random round in the epoch, it should follow from the adaptive
hardcore bit property that the sequence of bits that the verifier extracts from the device’s answers to preimage
tests during that epoch must look statistically random. We give a martingale-based argument to formalize
this intuition.
There is however a bigger challenge to analyzing the protocol — we must show that the sequence that
the verifier extracts from the device’s answers to preimage tests must look statistically random even to
an infinitely powerful quantum adversary, who may share an arbitrary entangled state with the quantum
device. If we could assert that each round of the protocol is played with a qubit exactly in state |+〉, and
measured in the standard basis basis for the case of a preimage test, then this would lead to an easy proof
that the extracted sequence looks random to the adversary. Unfortunately the characterization of the device’s
qubits leaves plenty of room for entanglement with the adversary. Showing that such entanglement cannot
leak too much information about the device’s measurements was the major challenge in previous work
on certified randomness through Bell inequality violations [VV11, MS14, AFDF+18]. Our cryptographic
setting presents a new difficulty, which is that in contrast to the Bell inequality violation scenarios, in our
setting it is not impossible for a deterministic device to succeed in the test: it is merely computationally
hard to do so. This prevents us from directly applying the results in [MS14, AFDF+18] and requires us to
suitably modify their framework. We describe this part of the argument in more detail below.
In terms of efficiency, for the specific LWE-based NTCF that we construct, our protocol can use as few
as poly log(N) bits of randomness to generate O(N) bits that are statistically within negligible distance
from uniform. However, this requires assuming that the underlying LWE assumption is hard even for sub-
exponential size quantum circuits with polynomial-size quantum advice (which is consistent with current
knowledge). The more conservative assumption that our variant of LWE is only hard for polynomial size
quantum circuits requires O(Nǫ) bits of randomness for generating the NTCF, for any constant ǫ > 0. The
following is an informal description; see Theorem 8.10 for a more formal statement.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). Let F be an NTCF family and λ a security parameter. Let N = Ω(λ2) and
assume the quantum hardness of solving lattice problems of dimension λ in time poly(N). There is an N-
round protocol for the interaction between a classical polynomial-time verifier and a quantum polynomial-
time device such that the protocol can be executed using poly(log(N),λ) bits of randomness, and for any
efficient device and side information E correlated with the device’s initial state,
Hδ∞(O|CE)ρ ≥ (ξ − o(1))N .
Here ξ is a positive constant, δ is a negligible function of λ, and ρ is the final state of the classical output
register O, the classical register C containing the verifier’s messages to the device, and the side information
E, restricted to transcripts that are accepted by the verifier in the protocol.
Sketch of the security analysis. We describe the protocol in slightly more detail (see Section 5 for a
formal description). The verifier first uses poly(log(N),λ) bits of randomness to select a pair of functions
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{ fk,b}b∈{0,1} from an NTCF family, and sends the public function key k to the quantum device. This pair
of functions can be interpreted as a single 2-to-1 function fk : (b, x) 7→ fk,b(x). The verifier keeps private
the trapdoor information that allows to invert fk. The protocol then proceeds for N rounds. In each round
the device first outputs a value y in the common range of fk,0 and fk,1. After having received y, the verifier
issues one of two challenges: 0 or 1, preimage or equation. If the challenge is “preimage”, then the device
must output an x such that f (x) = y. If the challenge is “equation” then the device must output a nontrivial
binary vector d such that d · (x0 ⊕ x1) = 0, where x0 and x1 are the unique preimages of y under fk,0 and
fk,1 respectively. Since the verifier has the secret key, she can efficiently compute x0 and x1 from y, and
therefore check the correctness of the device’s response to each challenge. The verifier chooses poly log(N)
rounds in which to issue the challenge 1, or “equation”, at random. Selecting these rounds requires only
poly log(N) random bits. At the end of each such round, the verifier samples a new pair of functions
from the NTCF family, and communicates the new public key to the device. On each of the remaining
N − poly log(N) rounds the verifier records a bit according to whether the device returns the preimage x0,
or x1 (e.g. recording 0 for the lexicographically smaller preimage). At the end of the protocol the verifier
uses a strong quantum-proof randomness extractor to extract Ω(N) bits of randomness from the recorded
string (this requires at most an additional poly log(N) bits of uniformly random seed).
To guarantee that the extractor produces bits that are statistically close to uniform, wewould like to prove
that the N − poly log(N) random bits recorded by the verifier must have Ω(N) bits of (smoothed) min-
entropy,1 even conditioned on the side information available to an infinitely powerful quantum adversary,
who may share an arbitrary entangled state with the quantum device.
The analysis proceeds as follows. First we assume without loss of generality that the entire protocol is
run coherently, i.e. we may assume that the initial state of the quantum device (holding quantum register
D) and the adversary (holding quantum register E) is a pure state |φ〉DE, since the adversary may as well
start with a purification of their joint state. We may also assume that the verifier starts with a cat state on
poly log(N) qubits, and uses one of the registers of the state, C, to provide the random bits used to select
the type of test being performed in each round. (This is for the sake of analysis only, the actual verifier is of
course completely classical.) We can similarly arrange that the state remains pure throughout the protocol by
using the principle of deferred measurement. Our goal is to show a lower bound on the smooth min-entropy
of the output register O in which the verifier has recorded the device’s outputs, conditioned on the state E
of the adversary, and on the register C of the cat state (conditioning on the latter represents the fact that
the verifier’s choice of challenges may be leaked to the adversary, and we would like security even in this
scenario). Intuitively, this amounts to bounding the information accessible to the most powerful adversary
quantum mechanics allows, conditioned on the joint state of the verifier and device.
In order to bound the entropy of the final state we need to show that the entropy “accumulates” at each
round of the protocol. A general framework to establish entropy accumulation in quantum protocols such as
the one considered here was introduced in [AFDF+18]. At a high level, the approach consists in reducing
the goal of a min-entropy bound to a bound on the appropriate notion of (1 + ε) quantum conditional Re´nyi
entropy, and then arguing that, under suitable conditions on the process that generates the outcomes recorded
in the protocol, entropy accumulates sequentially throughout the protocol.
In a little more detail, the first step on getting a handle on the smooth min-entropy is to use the quantum
asymptotic equipartion property (QAEP) [TCR09] to relate it to the (1 + ε) conditional Re´nyi entropy, for
suitably small ε. The second step uses a duality relation for the conditional Re´nyi entropy to relate the
(1 + ε) conditional Re´nyi entropy of the output register O, conditioned on the adversary side information
in R and the register C of the cat state, to a quantity analogous to the (1− ε′) conditional Re´nyi entropy
1We refer to Section 2 for definitions of entropic quantities.
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of the output register, conditioned on the register E for the device, and a purifying copy of the register C
of the cat state. The latter quantity, a suitable conditional entropy of the output register conditioned on the
challenge register and the state of the device, is the quantity that we ultimately aim to bound. Note what
these transformations have achieved for us: it is now sufficient to consider as side information only “known”
quantities in the protocol, the verifier’s choice of challenges and the device’s state; the information held by
the adversary plays no other role than that of a purifying register.
As mentioned earlier, our cryptographic setting presents the additional difficulty that our guarantee
is only that it is computationally hard for a deterministic device to succeed in the protocol. The results
in [AFDF+18, MS14] crucially rely on the fact that the process that generates the randomness does so
irrespective of the quantum state in which it is initialized (as long as the output of the process satisfies
the test’s success criterion). This requirement comes from the conditioning that is performed in order to
show that entropy accumulates; in our setting, conditioning is more delicate as it can in principle induce
non-computationally efficient states for the device.
Recall that we argued that for a single round of the protocol, we can decompose the device’s Hilbert
space into a direct sum of one- or two-dimensional subspaces, such that within most two-dimensional sub-
space the “preimage” and “equation” measurements correspond to orthonormal bases that make an angle
close to π/4 with each other. Showing that the Re´nyi entropy accumulates in each round requires a device
in which all angles are close to π/4, not “almost all”. To accommodate for this we “split” the state of
the device into its component on the good subspace, where the angles are unbiased, and the bad subspace,
where the measurements may be aligned. The fact that the distinction between good and bad subspace is
not measured in the protocol, but is only a distinction made for the analysis, requires us to apply a fairly
delicate martingale based argument that takes into account possible interference effects and bounds those
“branches” where the state has gone through the bad subspace an improbably large number of times. When-
ever the state lies in the good susbpace, we can appeal to an uncertainty principle from [MS14] to show that
the device’s measurement increases the conditional Re´nyi entropy of the output register by a small additive
constant. Pursuing this approach across all N rounds, we obtain a linear lower bound on the conditional
Re´nyi entropy of the output register, conditioned on the state of the device. As argued above this in turn
translates into a linear lower bound on the smooth conditional min-entropy of the output, conditioned on
the state of the adversary and the verifier’s choice of challenges. It only remains to apply a quantum-proof
randomness extractor to the output, using a poly-logarithmic number of additional bits of randomness, to
obtain the final result.
Our NTCF Family. Our goal is to construct a family of pairs of injective functions f0, f1 with the same
image such that it is hard to find a collision x0, x1 with f0(x0) = f1(x1), but so that given a suitable
trapdoor it is possible to recover, for any y, values x0, x1 such that f0(x0) = f1(x1) = y. We do this by
relying on the hardness of the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem [Reg05]. LWE states that given a public
uniformly random matrix A ∈ Zm×nq for m ≫ n, it is intractable to distinguish between u = As + e
(mod q) and a uniform vector, for a uniform vector s and small discrete Gaussian vector e (all arithmetic
from here on is performed modulo q; we use ⊕ to denote binary XOR). Inspired by [Mah17a], our function
pair will be characterized by (A, u = As + e), but for a binary vector s.2 The trapdoor for our function
is a lattice trapdoor for A that allows to recover s, e given a vector of the form As + e (it is possible to
generate A together with a trapdoor such that A is indistinguishable from uniform, as originally shown by
Ajtai [Ajt99]).
2It is known that LWE is hard even with binary secrets. We do not use this property explicitly but rather employ the respective
techniques in our proof.
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The structure of the LWE problem motivates us to consider functions f0, f1 that range over probability
distributions. Specifically, we define the distribution fb(x) as fb(x) = Ax + b · (As) + e′ where e′ is a
discrete Gaussian random variable with a sufficiently wide Gaussian parameter. Observe that the functions
have overlapping images in the following sense: f0(x) = f1(x− s). Moreover, since As + e′ is statisti-
cally indistinguishable from u + e′, we can efficiently sample from the distribution fb(x) up to negligible
statistical distance.
This probabilistic notion complicates the definition and use of the family, but the principles are similar
to the deterministic version.3
Adaptive Hardcore Bit. Finally, we need to show the adaptive hardcore bit property. Formally, letting
x0, x1 ∈ Znq be a collision, and letting z0, z1 ∈ {0, 1}n log q be their binary representations, respectively,
we need to show that it is intractable to come up with a pair (b, zb), for some b ∈ {0, 1}, together with a
nontrivial vector d and with the value d · (z0 ⊕ z1), with probability noticeably better than 12 . “Nontrivial”
here means belonging to a well defined and efficiently recognizable set D with density ≈ 1 in {0, 1}n log q
(e.g. the zero vector is obviously excluded). Assume for the sake of this overview that we get a tuple
(z0, d, c). We first notice that since x0, x1 is a collision, then x1 = x0 − s (mod q). We now use the fact
that s is a binary vector to show, using simple arithmetic, that z0 ⊕ z1 can be expressed as a linear function
of the bits of s, so that d · (z0 ⊕ z1) = dˆ · s (mod 2), for some dˆ ∈ {0, 1}n. (the description of this
transformation will effect our choice of the set D). We thus need to show that it is intractable, given the
instance (A, u = As + e), to come up with dˆ, dˆ · s (mod 2). To prove this we use the lossiness technique
used in [GKPV10] and show that this is equivalent to coming up with dˆ, dˆ · s (mod 2) given B, Bs where
B ∈ Zk×nq is now a highly shrinking function, even for binary inputs, i.e. k log q ≪ n. This seems like
an easy task since the adversary now doesn’t have the complete information about s so it shouldn’t be able
to compute dˆ · s (mod 2) for any reasonable dˆ, except dˆ might depend on B itself (recall that dˆ is chosen
adversarially). We prove via Fourier analysis that if B is sufficiently shrinking, then there is no dˆ that can
take advantage of the dependence on B, which completes the proof.
Concurrent and related work. The idea of using a TCF as a basic primitive in interactions between an
efficient quantum prover and a classical verifier has been further developed in recent work by Mahadev
[Mah17b], giving the first construction of a quantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme with classical
keys. In further follow-up work, Mahadev [Mah18] shows a remarkable use of a NTCF family with adaptive
hardcore bit. Namely, that the NTCF can be used to certify that a prover measures a qubit in a prescribed
basis (standard or Hadamard). This allows to achieve single prover verifiability for quantum computations
using a purely classical verifier (but relying on computational assumptions).
Independently of this work, a construction of trapdoor one-way functions with second preimage resis-
tance based on LWE was recently introduced in [CCKW18], where it is used to achieve delegated compu-
tation in the weaker honest-but-curious model for the adversary (i.e. without soundness against provers not
following the protocol). The family of functions considered in [CCKW18] is not sufficient for our purposes,
as it lacks the adaptive hardcore bit property.
We believe that the technique of constraining the power of a quantum device using NTCFs promises to
be a powerful tool for the field of untrusted quantum devices.
3Another possible variant is to define fb(x) = ⌊Ax + b · (As)⌉ where ⌊·⌉ is a rounding function that truncates “many” of the
least significant bits of its operand. However, we remain with the Gaussian variant which is easier to analyze.
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Organization. We start with some notation and preliminaries in Section 2. Section 3 contains the defini-
tion of a noisy trapdoor claw-free family (NTCF). Our construction for such a family is given in Section 4
(with Appendix 2.3 containing relevant preliminaries on the learning with errors problem). The randomness
generation protocol is described in Section 5. In Section 6 we introduce our formalism for modeling the
actions of an arbitrary prover, or device, in the protocol. In Section 7 we analyze a single round of the
protocol, and in Section 8 we show that randomness accumulates across multiple rounds.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
Z is the set of integers, and N the set of natural numbers. For any q ∈ N such that q ≥ 2 we let Zq denote
the ring of integers modulo q. We generally identify an element x ∈ Zq with its unique representative
[x]q ∈ (− q2 , q2 ] ∩Z. For x ∈ Zq we define |x| = |[x]q|. When considering an s ∈ {0, 1}n we sometimes
also think of s as an element of Znq , in which case we write it as s.
We use the terminology of polynomially bounded and negligible functions. A function n : N → R+
is polynomially bounded if there exists a polynomial p such that n(λ) ≤ p(λ) for all λ ∈ N. A function
n : N → R+ is negligible if for every polynomial p, p(λ)n(λ) →λ→∞ 0. We write negl(λ) to denote an
arbitrary negligible function of λ. For two parameters κ,λ we write κ ≪ λ to express the constraint that κ
should be “sufficiently smaller than” λ, meaning that there exists a small universal constant c > 0 such that
κ ≤ cλ, where c is usually implicit for context.
H always denotes a finite-dimensional Hilbert space. We use indices HA, HB, etc., to refer to distinct
spaces. Pos(H) is the set of positive semidefinite operators onH, and D(H) the set of density matrices, i.e.
the positive semidefinite operators with trace 1. For an operator X onH, we use ‖X‖ to denote the operator
norm (largest singular value) of X, and ‖X‖tr = 12‖X‖1 = 12Tr
√
XX† for the trace norm.
2.2 Distributions
We generally use the letter D to denote a distribution over a finite domain X, and f for a density on X,
i.e. a function f : X → [0, 1] such that ∑x∈X f (x) = 1. We often use the distribution and its density
interchangeably. We write U for the uniform distribution. We write x ← D to indicate that x is sampled
from distribution D, and x ←U X to indicate that x is sampled uniformly from the set X. We write DX for
the set of all densities on X. For any f ∈ DX , SUPP( f ) denotes the support of f ,
SUPP( f ) =
{
x ∈ X | f (x) > 0} .
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For two densities f1 and f2 over the same finite domain X, the Hellinger distance between f1 and f2 is
H2( f1, f2) = 1− ∑
x∈X
√
f1(x) f2(x) . (1)
The total variation distance between f1 and f2 is
‖ f1 − f2‖TV = 1
2 ∑x∈X
| f1(x)− f2(x)| ≤
√
2H2( f1, f2) . (2)
The following immediate lemma relates the Hellinger distance and the trace distance of superpositions.
Lemma 2.1. Let X be a finite set and f1, f2 ∈ DX . Let
|ψ1〉 = ∑
x∈X
√
f1(x)|x〉 and |ψ2〉 = ∑
x∈X
√
f2(x)|x〉 .
Then
‖|ψ1〉 − |ψ2〉‖tr =
√
1− (1− H2( f1, f2))2 .
We say that a family of quantum circuits {Cλ}λ∈N is polynomial-time generated if there exists a
polynomial-time deterministic Turing machine that, on every input λ ∈ N, returns a gate-by-gate encoding
of the circuit Cλ. We introduce a notion of efficient distinguishability between distributions.
Definition 2.2. We say that two families of distributions D0 = {D0,λ}λ∈N and D1 = {D1,λ}λ∈N on the
same finite set {Xλ} are computationally indistinguishable if for every polynomial-time generated family
of quantum circuits A = {Aλ : Xλ → {0, 1}} it holds that∣∣∣ Pr
x←D0,λ
[Aλ(x) = 0]− Pr
x←D1,λ
[Aλ(x) = 0]
∣∣∣ = negl(λ) . (3)
The next definition generalizes the previous one to the case of quantum states.
Definition 2.3. We say that two families of sub-normalized densities σ0 = {σ0,λ}λ∈N and σ1 = {σ1,λ}λ∈N
on the same Hilbert space {Hλ} are computationally indistinguishable if for every polynomial-time gener-
ated family of observables O = {Oλ}λ∈N it holds that∣∣Tr(Oλ(σ0,λ − σ1,λ))∣∣ = negl(λ) .
2.3 The Learning with Errors problem
We give some background on the Learning with Errors problem (LWE). For a positive real B and a positive
integer q, the truncated discrete Gaussian distribution over Zq with parameter B is the distribution supported
on {x ∈ Zq : ‖x‖ ≤ B} with density
D
Zq,B(x) =
e
−π‖x‖2
B2
∑
x∈Zq, ‖x‖≤B
e
−π‖x‖2
B2
. (4)
More generally, for a positive integer m the truncated discrete Gaussian distribution over Zmq with parameter
B is the distribution supported on {x ∈ Zmq : ‖x‖ ≤ B
√
m} with density
∀x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Zmq , DZmq ,B(x) = DZq,B(x1) · · ·DZq,B(xm) . (5)
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Lemma 2.4. Let B be a positive real and q, m positive integers. Let e ∈ Zmq . The Hellinger distance between
the distribution D = D
Z
m
q ,B and the shifted distribution D + e, with density (D + e)(x) = D(x − e),
satisfies
H2(D, D + e) ≤ 1− e−2π
√
m‖e‖
B , (6)
and the statistical distance between the two distributions satisfies∥∥D − (D + e)∥∥2
TV
≤ 2
(
1− e−2π
√
m‖e‖
B
)
. (7)
Proof. Let τ = ∑
x∈Zq, ‖x‖≤B
e
−π‖x‖2
B2 . We can compute
∑
e0∈Zmq
√
D
Z
m
q ,B(e0)DZmq ,B(e0 − e) = ∑
e0∈Zmq
√
DB(e)DB(e0 − e)
=
1
τm ∑
e∈Zmq
e
−π(‖e0‖2+‖e0−e‖2)
2B2
≥ 1
τm ∑
e0∈Zmq
e
−π(‖e0‖2+(‖e0‖+‖e‖)2)
2B2
=
1
τm ∑
e0∈Zmq
e
−π(‖e0‖2)
B2 e
−π(2‖e0‖‖e‖)
2B2 e
−π(‖e‖2)
2B2
≥ e
−π(‖e‖2+2‖e0‖‖e‖)
2B2
1
τm ∑
e0∈Zmq
e
−π(‖e0‖)2
B2
= e
−π(‖e‖2+2‖e0‖‖e‖)
2B2
≥ e
−2π‖e0‖‖e‖
B2 .
Using the fact that for any e0 in the support of D
Z
m
q ,B, ‖e0‖ ≤ B
√
m, gives the claimed bound. The bound
on the statistical distance follows from the bound on the Hellinger distance using the inequality in (2).
We define the main assumption that underlies all computational hardness claims made in the paper.
Definition 2.5. For a security parameter λ, let n, m, q ∈ N be integer functions of λ. Let χ = χ(λ)
be a distribution over Z. The LWEn,m,q,χ problem is to distinguish between the distributions (A, As + e
(mod q)) and (A, u), where A ←U Zn×mq , s ←U Znq , e ← χm, and u ←U Zmq . Often we consider the
hardness of solving LWE for any function m such that m is at most a polynomial in n log q. This problem
is denoted LWEn,q,χ.
In this paper wemake the assumption that no quantum polynomial-time procedure can solve the LWEn,q,χ
problem with more than a negligible advantage in λ, even when given access to a quantum polynomial-size
advice state depending on the parameters n, m, q and χ of the problem. We refer to this assumption as “the
LWEn,q,χ assumption”.
As shown in [Reg05, PRS17], for any α > 0 such that σ = αq ≥ 2√n the LWEn,q,D
Zq,σ
problem, where
D
Zq,σ is the discrete Gaussian distribution, is at least as hard as approximating the shortest independent vec-
tor problem (SIVP) to within a factor of γ = O˜(n/α), where O˜ hides factors logarithmic in the argument,
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in worst case dimension n lattices. This is proven using a quantum reduction. Classical reductions (to a
slightly different problem) exist as well [Pei09, BLP+13] but with somewhat worse parameters. The best
known (classical or quantum) algorithm for these problems run in time 2O˜(n/ logγ). For our construction,
given in Section 4, we assume hardness of the problem against a quantum polynomial-time adversary in the
case that γ is a super polynomial function in n. This is a commonly used assumption in cryptography (for
e.g. homomorphic encryption schemes such as [GSW13]).
We use two additional properties of the LWE problem. The first is that it is possible to generate LWE
samples (A, As + e) such that there is a trapdoor allowing recovery of s from the samples.
Theorem 2.6 (Theorem 5.1 in [MP12]). Let n, m ≥ 1 and q ≥ 2 be such that m = Ω(n log q). There is
an efficient randomized algorithm GENTRAP(1n, 1m, q) that returns a matrix A ∈ Zm×nq and a trapdoor
tA such that the distribution of A is negligibly (in n) close to the uniform distribution. Moreover, there is
an efficient algorithm INVERT that, on input A, tA and As + e where ‖e‖ ≤ q/(CT
√
n log q) and CT is a
universal constant, returns s and e with overwhelming probability over (A, tA) ← GENTRAP(1n, 1m, q).
The second property is the existence of a “lossy mode” for LWE. The following definition is Defini-
tion 3.1 in [AKPW13].
Definition 2.7. Let χ = χ(λ) be an efficiently sampleable distribution over Zq. Define a lossy sampler
A˜ ← LOSSY(1n, 1m, 1ℓ, q,χ) by A˜ = BC + F, where B ←U Zm×ℓq , C ←U Zℓ×nq , F ← χm×n.
Theorem 2.8 (Lemma 3.2 in [AKPW13]). Under the LWEℓ,q,χ assumption, the distribution of a random
A˜ ← LOSSY(1n, 1m, 1ℓ, q,χ) is computationally indistinguishable from A ←U Zm×nq .
2.4 Entropies
For p ∈ [0, 1] we write H(p) = −p log p − (1 − p) log(1 − p) for the binary Shannon entropy. We
measure randomness using Re´nyi conditional entropies. For a positive semidefinite matrix σ ∈ Pos(H) and
ε ≥ 0, let 〈
σ
〉
1+ε
= Tr
(
σ1+ε
)
.
This quantity satisfies the following approximate linearity relations:
∀ε ∈ [0, 1] , 〈σ〉1+ε + 〈τ〉1+ε ≤ 〈σ+ τ〉1+ε ≤
(
1 + O(ε)
)(〈σ〉1+ε + 〈τ〉1+ε) . (8)
In addition, for positive semidefinite σ, ρ ∈ Pos(H) such that the support of ρ is included in the support of
σ, and ε ≥ 0, let
Q˜1+ε(ρ‖σ) = 〈σ−
ε
2(1+ε)ρσ
− ε
2(1+ε) 〉1+ε . (9)
Quantum analogues of the conditional Re´nyi entropies can be defined as follows.
Definition 2.9. Let ρAB ∈ Pos(HA ⊗HB) be positive semidefinite. Given ε > 0, the (1+ ε) Re´nyi entropy
of A conditioned on B is defined as
H1+ε(A|B)ρ = sup
σ∈D(HB)
H1+ε(A|B)ρ|σ ,
where for any σB ∈ D(HB),
H1+ε(A|B)ρ|σ = −
1
ε
log Q˜1+ε(ρ‖σ) .
.
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Re´nyi entropies are used in the proofs because they have better “chain-rule-like” properties than the
min-entropy, which is the most appropriate measure for randomness quantification.
Definition 2.10. Let ρAB ∈ Pos(HA ⊗ HB) be positive semidefinite. Given a density matrix the min-
entropy of A conditioned on B is defined as
H∞(A|B)ρ = sup
σ∈D(HB)
H∞(A|B)ρ|σ ,
where for any σB ∈ D(HB),
H∞(A|B)ρ|σ = max
{
λ ≥ 0 | 2−λ IdA ⊗σB ≥ ρAB
}
.
It is often convenient to consider the smooth min-entropy, which is obtained by maximizing the min-
entropy over all positive semidefinite operators matrices in an ε-neighborhood of ρAB. The definition of
neighborhood depends on a choice of metric; the canonical choice is the “purified distance”. Since this
choice will not matter for us we defer to [Tom15] for a precise definition.
Definition 2.11. Let ε ≥ 0 and ρAB ∈ Pos(HA ⊗HB) positive semidefinite. The ε-smooth min-entropy of
A conditioned on B is defined as
Hε∞(A|B)ρ = sup
σAB∈B(ρAB,ε)
H∞(A|B)σ ,
where B(ρAB, ε) is the ball of radius ε around ρAB, taken with respect to the purified distance.
The following theorem relates the min-entropy to the the Re´nyi entropies introduced earlier. The theorem
expresses the fact that, up to a small amount of “smoothing” (the parameter δ in the theorem), all these
entropies are of similar order.
Theorem 2.12 (Theorem 4.1 [MS14]). Let ρXE ∈ Pos(HX ⊗ HE) be positive semidefinite of the form
ρXE = ∑x∈X |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE, where X is a finite alphabet. Let σE ∈ D(HE) be an arbitrary density matrix.
Then for any δ > 0 and 0 < ε ≤ 1,
Hδ∞(X|E)ρ ≥ −
1
ε
log
(
∑
x
Q˜1+ε
(
ρx
E
‖σE
))− 1 + 2 log(1/δ)
ε
.
3 Trapdoor claw-free hash functions
Let λ be a security parameter, and X and Y finite sets (depending on λ). For our purposes an ideal family
of functions F would have the following properties. For each public key k, there are two functions { fk,b :
X → Y}b∈{0,1} that are both injective and have the same range, and are invertible given a suitable trapdoor
tk (i.e. tk can be used to compute x given b and y = fk,b(x)). Furthermore, the pair of functions should be
claw-free: it must be hard for an attacker to find two pre-images x0, x1 ∈ X such that fk,0(x0) = fk,1(x1).
Finally, the functions should satisfy an adaptive hardcore bit property, which is a stronger form of the
claw-free property: assuming for convenience that X = {0, 1}w, we would like that it is computationally
infeasible to simultaneously generate a pair (b, xb) ∈ {0, 1} × X and a d ∈ {0, 1}w \ {0w} such that with
non-negligible advantage over 12 the equation d · (x0 ⊕ x1) = 0, where x1−b is defined as the unique element
such that fk,1−b(x1−b) = fk,b(xb), holds.
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Unfortunately, we do not know how to construct a function family that exactly satisfies all these re-
quirements under standard cryptographic assumptions. Instead, we construct a family that satisfies slightly
relaxed requirements, that we will show still suffice for our purposes, based on the hardness of the learning
with errors problem introduced in Section 2.3. The requirements are relaxed as follows. First, the range of
the functions is no longer a set Y ; instead, it is DY , the set of probability densities over Y . That is, each
function returns a density, rather than a point. The trapdoor injective pair property is then described in terms
of the support of the output densities: these supports should either be identical, for a colliding pair, or be
disjoint, in all other cases.
The consideration of functions that return densities gives rise to an additional requirement of efficiency:
there should exist a quantum polynomial-time procedure that efficiently prepares a superposition over the
range of the function, i.e. for any key k and b ∈ {0, 1}, the procedure can prepare the state
1√X ∑x∈X ,y∈Y
√(
fk,b(x)
)
(y)|x〉|y〉 . (10)
In our instantiation based on LWE, it is not possible to prepare (10) perfectly, but it is possible to create a
superposition with coefficients
√
( f ′k,b(x))(y), such that the resulting state is within negligible trace distance
of (10). The density f ′k,b(x) is required to satisfy two properties used in our protocol. First, it must be easy
to check, without the trapdoor, if an y ∈ Y lies in the support of f ′k,b(x). Second, the inversion algorithm
should operate correctly on all y in the support of f ′k,b(x).
We slightly modify the adaptive hardcore bit requirement as well. Since the set X may not be a subset
of binary strings, we first assume the existence of an injective, efficiently invertible map J : X → {0, 1}w .
Next, we only require the adaptive hardcore bit property to hold for a subset of all nonzero strings, instead
of the set {0, 1}w \ {0w}. Finally, membership in the appropriate set should be efficiently checkable, given
access to the trapdoor.
A formal definition follows.
Definition 3.1 (NTCF family). Let λ be a security parameter. Let X and Y be finite sets. LetKF be a finite
set of keys. A family of functions
F = { fk,b : X → DY}k∈KF ,b∈{0,1}
is called a noisy trapdoor claw free (NTCF) family if the following conditions hold:
1. Efficient Function Generation. There exists an efficient probabilistic algorithm GENF which gen-
erates a key k ∈ KF together with a trapdoor tk:
(k, tk) ← GENF (1λ) .
2. Trapdoor Injective Pair. For all keys k ∈ KF the following conditions hold.
(a) Trapdoor: For all b ∈ {0, 1} and x 6= x′ ∈ X , SUPP( fk,b(x)) ∩ SUPP( fk,b(x′)) = ∅. More-
over, there exists an efficient deterministic algorithm INVF such that for all b ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ X
and y ∈ SUPP( fk,b(x)), INVF (tk, b, y) = x.
(b) Injective pair: There exists a perfect matching Rk ⊆ X × X such that fk,0(x0) = fk,1(x1) if
and only if (x0, x1) ∈ Rk.
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3. Efficient Range Superposition. For all keys k ∈ KF and b ∈ {0, 1} there exists a function f ′k,b :
X → DY such that the following hold.
(a) For all (x0, x1) ∈ Rk and y ∈ SUPP( f ′k,b(xb)), INVF (tk, b, y) = xb and INVF (tk, b⊕ 1, y) =
xb⊕1.
(b) There exists an efficient deterministic procedure CHKF that, on input k, b ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ X and
y ∈ Y , returns 1 if y ∈ SUPP( f ′k,b(x)) and 0 otherwise. Note that CHKF is not provided the
trapdoor tk.
(c) For every k and b ∈ {0, 1},
Ex←UX
[
H2( fk,b(x), f
′
k,b(x))
] ≤ µ(λ) ,
for some negligible function µ(·). Here H2 is the Hellinger distance; see (1). Moreover, there
exists an efficient procedure SAMPF that on input k and b ∈ {0, 1} prepares the state
1√|X | ∑x∈X ,y∈Y
√
( f ′k,b(x))(y)|x〉|y〉 . (11)
4. Adaptive Hardcore Bit. For all keys k ∈ KF the following conditions hold, for some integer w that
is a polynomially bounded function of λ.
(a) For all b ∈ {0, 1} and x ∈ X , there exists a set Gk,b,x ⊆ {0, 1}w such that Prd←U{0,1}w [d /∈
Gk,b,x] is negligible, and moreover there exists an efficient algorithm that checks for membership
in Gk,b,x given k, b, x and the trapdoor tk.
(b) There is an efficiently computable injection J : X → {0, 1}w , such that J can be inverted
efficiently on its range, and such that the following holds. If
Hk =
{
(b, xb, d, d · (J(x0)⊕ J(x1))) | b ∈ {0, 1}, (x0, x1) ∈ Rk, d ∈ Gk,0,x0 ∩ Gk,1,x1
}
, 4
Hk = {(b, xb, d, c) | (b, x, d, c⊕ 1) ∈ Hk
}
,
then for any quantum polynomial-time procedure A there exists a negligible function µ(·) such
that ∣∣∣ Pr
(k,tk)←GENF (1λ)
[A(k) ∈ Hk]− Pr
(k,tk)←GENF (1λ)
[A(k) ∈ Hk]
∣∣∣ ≤ µ(λ) . (12)
4 A Trapdoor Claw-Free family based on LWE
In this section we present our LWE-based construction of an NTCF. For LWE-related preliminaries and
definitions see Section 2.3. Let λ be a security parameter. All other parameters are functions of λ. Let
q ≥ 2 be a prime. Let ℓ, n, m, w ≥ 1 be polynomially bounded functions of λ and BL, BV , BP be positive
4Note that although both x0 and x1 are referred to to define the set Hk, only one of them, xb , is explicitly specified in any 4-tuple
that lies in Hk.
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integers such that the following conditions hold:
1. n = Ω(ℓ log q) and m = Ω(n log q),
2. w = n⌈log q⌉,
3. BP =
q
2CT
√
mn log q
, for CT the universal constant in Theorem 2.6,
4. 2
√
n ≤ BL < BV < BP,
5. The ratio BPBV
and BVBL
are both super-polynomial in λ.
(13)
Given a choice of parameters satisfying all conditions in (13), we describe the function family FLWE. Let
X = Znq and Y = Zmq . The key space KFLWE is a subset of Zm×nq × Zmq defined in Section 4.1. For
b ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ X and key k = (A, As + e), the density fk,b(x) is defined as
∀y ∈ Y , ( fk,b(x))(y) = DZmq ,BP(y−Ax− b ·As) , (14)
where the density D
Z
m
q ,BP is defined in (4). It follows from the definition of the key generation procedure
GENFLWE given in Section 4.1 that fk,b is well-defined given k = (A, As + e), as for our choice of param-
eters k uniquely identifies s.
The four properties required for a noisy trapdoor claw-free family, as specified in Definition 3.1, are
verified in the following subsections, providing a proof of the following theorem. Recall the definition of
the hardness assumption LWEn,q,χ given in Definition 2.5.
Theorem 4.1. For any choice of parameters satisfying the conditions (13), the function family FLWE is a
noisy trapdoor claw free family under the hardness assumption LWEℓ,q,D
Zq,BL
.
4.1 Efficient Function Generation
GENFLWE is defined as follows. First, the procedure samples a random A ∈ Zm×nq , together with trapdoor
information tA. This is done using the procedure GENTRAP(1n, 1m, q) from Theorem 2.6. The trapdoor
allows the evaluation of an inversion algorithm INVERT that, on input A, tA and b = As + e returns s and e
as long as ‖e‖ ≤ q
CT
√
n log q
. Moreover, the distribution on matrices A returned by GENTRAP is negligibly
close to the uniform distribution on Zm×nq .
Next, the sampling procedure selects s ∈ {0, 1}n uniformly at random, and a vector e ∈ Zmq by sampling
each coordinate independently according to the distribution D
Zq,BV defined in (4). GENFLWE returns k =
(A, As + e) and tk = tA.
4.2 Trapdoor Injective Pair
(a) Trapdoor. It follows from (14) and the definition of the distribution D
Z
m
q ,BP in (4) that for any key
k = (A, As + e) ∈ KFLWE and for all x ∈ X ,
SUPP( fk,0(x)) =
{
Ax + e0 | ‖e0‖ ≤ BP
√
m
}
, (15)
SUPP( fk,1(x)) =
{
Ax + As + e0 | ‖e0‖ ≤ BP
√
m
}
. (16)
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The procedure INVFLWE takes as input the trapdoor tA, b ∈ {0, 1}, and y ∈ Y . It uses the algorithm
INVERT to determine s0, e0 such that y = As0 + e0, and returns the element s0 − b · s ∈ X . Using
Theorem 2.6, this procedure returns the unique correct outcome provided y = As0 + e0 for some e0
such that ‖e0‖ ≤ q
CT
√
n log q
. This condition is satisfied for all y ∈ SUPP( fk,b(x)) provided BP is
chosen so that
BP ≤ q
CT
√
mn log q
. (17)
(b) Injective Pair. We let Rk be the set of all pairs (x0, x1) such that fk,0(x0) = fk,1(x1). By definition
this occurs if and only if x1 = x0 − s, and so Rk is a perfect matching.
4.3 Efficient Range Superposition
For k = (A, As + e) ∈ KFLWE , b ∈ {0, 1} and x ∈ X , let
( f ′k,b(x))(y) = DZmq ,BP(y−Ax− b · (As + e)) . (18)
Note that f ′k,0(x) = fk,0(x) for all x ∈ X . The distributions f ′k,1(x) and fk,1(x) are shifted by e. Given the
key k and x ∈ X , the densities f ′k,0(x) and f ′k,1(x) are efficiently computable. For all x ∈ X ,
SUPP( f ′k,0(x)) = SUPP( fk,0(x)) , (19)
SUPP( f ′k,1(x)) =
{
Ax + e0 + As + e | ‖e0‖ ≤ BP
√
m
}
. (20)
(a) Using that BV < BP, it follows that the norm of the term e0 + e in (20) is always at most 2BP
√
m.
Therefore, the inversion procedure INVFLWE can be guaranteed to return x on input tA, b ∈ {0, 1},
y ∈ SUPP( f ′k,b(x)) if we strengthen the requirement on BP given in (17) to
BP ≤ q
2CT
√
mn log q
. (21)
This strengthened trapdoor requirement also implies that for all b ∈ {0, 1}, (x0, x1) ∈ Rk, and
y ∈ SUPP( f ′k,b(xb)), INVFLWE(tA, b⊕ 1, y) = xb⊕1.
(b) On input k = (A, As + e), b ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ X , and y ∈ Y , the procedure CHKFLWE operates as
follows. If b = 0, it computes e′ = y − Ax. If ‖e′‖ ≤ BP
√
m, the procedure returns 1, and 0
otherwise. If b = 1, it computes e′ = y − Ax − (As + e). If ‖e′‖ ≤ BP
√
m, it returns 1, and 0
otherwise.
(c) We bound the Hellinger distance between the densities fk,b(x) and f
′
k,b(x). If b = 0 they are identical.
If b = 1, both densities are shifts of D
Z
m
q ,BP , where the shifts differ by e. Each coordinate of e is
drawn independently from D
Zq,BV , so ‖e‖ ≤
√
mBV . Applying Lemma 2.4, we get that
H2( fk,1(x), f
′
k,1(x)) ≤ 1− e
−2πmBV
BP .
Using the assumption that BP/BV is super-polynomial, this is negligible, as desired. It remains to
describe the procedure SAMPFLWE . At the first step, the procedure creates the following superposition
∑
e0∈Zmq
√
D
Z
m
q ,BP(e0)|e0〉 . (22)
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This state can be prepared efficiently as described in [Reg05, Lemma 3.12].5
At the second step, the procedure creates a uniform superposition over x ∈ X , yielding the state
q−
n
2 ∑
x∈X
e0∈Zmq
√
D
Z
m
q ,BP(e0)|x〉|e0〉 . (23)
At the third step, using the key k = (A, As + e) and the input bit b the procedure computes
q−
n
2 ∑
x∈X
e0∈Zmq
√
D
Z
m
q ,BP(e0)|x〉|e0〉|Ax + e0 + b · (As + e)〉 . (24)
At this point, observe that e0 can be computed from x, the last register, b and the key k. The procedure
can then uncompute the register containing e0, yielding
q−
n
2 ∑
x∈X
e0∈Zmq
√
D
Z
m
q ,BP(e0)|x〉|Ax + e0 + b · (As + e)〉
= q−
n
2 ∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
√
D
Z
m
q ,BP(y−Ax− b · (As + e))|x〉|y〉
= q−
n
2 ∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
√
( f ′k,b(x))(y)|x〉|y〉 . (25)
4.4 Adaptive Hardcore Bit
This section is devoted to the proof of the adaptive hardcore bit condition. The main statement is provided
in Lemma 4.7 in Section 4.4.3. The proof of the lemma proceeds in three steps. First, in Section 4.4.1 we
establish some preliminary results on the distribution of the inner product (dˆ · s mod 2), where dˆ ∈ {0, 1}n
is a fixed nonzero binary vector and s ←U {0, 1}n a uniformly random binary vector, conditioned on
Cs = v for some randomly chosen matrix C ∈ Zℓ×nq and arbitrary v ∈ Zℓq. This condition is combined with
the LWE assumption in Section 4.4.2 to argue that (dˆ · s mod 2) remains computationally indistinguishable
from uniform even when the matrix C is an LWE matrix A, and the adversary is able to choose dˆ after being
given access to As + e for some error vector e ∈ Zmq . Finally, in Section 4.4.3 the required hardcore bit
condition is reduced to the one established in Section 4.4.2 by relating the inner product appearing in the
definition of Hk (in condition 4.(b) of Definition 3.1) to an inner product of the form dˆ · s, where dˆ can be
efficiently computed from d.
4.4.1 Moderate matrices
The following lemma argues that, provided the matrix C ∈ Zℓ×nq is a uniformly random matrix with suffi-
ciently few rows, the distribution (C, Cs) for arbitrary s ∈ {0, 1}n does not reveal any parity of s.
5Specifically, the state can be created using a technique by Grover and Rudolph ([GR02]), who show that in order to create such
a state, it suffices to have the ability to efficiently compute the sum
d
∑
x=c
D
Zq ,BP(x) for any c, d ∈ {−⌊
√
BP⌋, . . . , ⌈
√
BP⌉} ⊆ Zq
and to within good precision. This can be done using standard techniques used to sample from the normal distribution.
19
Lemma 4.2. Let q be a prime, ℓ, n ≥ 1 integers, and C ∈ Zℓ×nq a uniformly random matrix. With probability
at least 1− qℓ · 2− n8 over the choice of C the following holds. For a fixed C, all v ∈ Zℓq and dˆ ∈ {0, 1}n \
{0n}, the distribution of (dˆ · s mod 2), where s is uniform in {0, 1}n conditioned on Cs = v, is within
statistical distance O(q
3ℓ
2 · 2− n40 ) of the uniform distribution over {0, 1}.
To prove the lemma we introduce the notion of a moderate matrix.
Definition 4.3. Let b ∈ Znq . We say that b is moderate if it contains at least n4 entries whose unique
representative in (−q/2, q/2] has its absolute value in the range ( q8 , 3q8 ]. A matrix C ∈ Zℓ×nq is moderate if
its entire row span (except 0n) is moderate.
Lemma 4.4. Let q be prime and ℓ, n be integers. Then
Pr
C←UZℓ×nq
(
C is moderate
) ≥ 1− qℓ · 2− n8 .
Proof. Consider an arbitrary non zero vector b in the row-span of a uniform C. Then the marginal distribu-
tion of b is uniform. By Chernoff, b is moderate with probability at least 1− e− 2n16 ≥ 1− 2− n8 . Applying
the union bound over all at most qℓ − 1 non zero vectors in the row span, the result follows.
Lemma 4.5. Let C ∈ Zℓ×nq be an arbitrary moderate matrix and let dˆ ∈ {0, 1}n \ {0n} be an arbitrary non
zero binary vector. Let s be uniform over {0, 1}n and consider the random variables v = Cs mod q and
z = dˆ · s mod 2. Then (v, z) is within total variation distance at most q ℓ2 · 2− n40 of the uniform distribution
over Zℓq × {0, 1}.
Proof. Let f be the probability density function of (v, z). Interpreting z as an element of Z2, let fˆ be
the Fourier transform over Zℓq × Z2. Let U denote the density of the uniform distribution over Zℓq × Z2.
Applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
1
2
∥∥ f −U∥∥
1
≤
√
qℓ
2
∥∥ f −U∥∥
2
=
1
2
∥∥ fˆ − Uˆ∥∥
2
=
1
2
(
∑
(vˆ,zˆ)∈Zℓq×Z2\{(0,0)}
∣∣ fˆ (vˆ, zˆ)∣∣2)1/2 , (26)
where the second line follows from Parseval’s identity, and for the third line we used fˆ (0, 0) = Uˆ(0, 0) = 1
and Uˆ(vˆ, zˆ) = 0 for all (vˆ, zˆ) 6= (0ℓ, 0). To bound (26) we estimate the Fourier coefficients of f . Denoting
ω2q = e
− 2πi2q , for any (vˆ, zˆ) ∈ Zℓq ×Z2 we can write
fˆ (vˆ, zˆ) = Es
[
ω
(2·vˆTC+q·zˆdˆT)s
2q
]
= Es
[
ωw
Ts
2q
]
= ∏
i
Esi
[
ω
wisi
2q
]
, (27)
where we wrote wT = 2 · vˆTC + q · zˆdˆT ∈ Zn2q. It follows that fˆ (0ℓ, 1) = 0, since (d · s mod 2) is
uniform for s uniform.
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We now observe that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that the representative of (vˆTC)i in (−q/2, q/2] has
its absolute value in ( q8 ,
3q
8 ] it holds that
wi
q ∈ ( 14 , 34 ] mod 1, in which case∣∣Esi [ωwisi2q ]∣∣ = ∣∣∣ cos (π2 · wiq )∣∣∣ ≤ cos (π8 ) ≤ 2− 110 . (28)
Since C is moderate, there are at least n4 such entries, so that from (27) it follows that | fˆ (vˆ, zˆ)| ≤ 2−
n
40 for
all vˆ 6= 0. Recalling (26), the lemma is proved.
We now prove Lemma 4.2 by generalizing Lemma 4.5 to adaptive d (i.e. d can depend on C, Cs).
Proof of Lemma 4.2. We assume C is moderate; by Lemma 4.4, C is moderate with probability at least
1− qℓ · 2− n8 . Let s be uniform over {0, 1}n , D1 = (Cs, dˆ · s mod 2), and D2 uniformly distributed over
Z
ℓ
q × {0, 1}. Using that C is moderate, it follows from Lemma 4.5 that
ε = ‖D1 − D2‖TV ≤ q ℓ2 · 2−n40 . (29)
Fix v0 ∈ Zℓq and let
∆ =
1
2 ∑
b∈{0,1}
∣∣∣ Pr
s←U{0,1}n
(
dˆ · s mod 2 = b ∣∣Cs = v0)− 1
2
∣∣∣ . (30)
To prove the lemma it suffices to establish the appropriate upper bound on ∆, for all v0. By definition,
ε = ‖D1 − D2‖TV = 1
2 ∑
b∈{0,1},v∈Zℓq
∣∣∣ Pr (Cs = v)Pr (dˆ · s mod 2 = b ∣∣Cs = v)− 1
2qℓ
∣∣∣
≥ 1
2 ∑
b∈{0,1}
∣∣∣Pr (Cs = v0)Pr (dˆ · s mod 2 = b ∣∣Cs = v0)− 1
2qℓ
∣∣∣
=
1
2 ∑
b∈{0,1}
∣∣∣Pr (Cs = v0)(1
2
+ (−1)b∆
)
− 1
2qℓ
∣∣∣ , (31)
where all probabilities are under a uniform choice of s ←U {0, 1}n , and the last line follows from the
definition of ∆ in (30). Applying the inequality |a| + |b| ≥ max(|a − b|, |a + b|), valid for any real a, b,
to (31) it follows that
Pr
(
Cs = v0
) · ∆ ≤ ε and Pr (Cs = v0) ≥ 1
qℓ
− 2ε . (32)
If q3ℓ/22−
n
40 >
1
3 the bound claimed in the lemma is trivial. If q
3ℓ/22−
n
40 ≤ 13 , then εqℓ ≤ 13 , so it follows
from (32) that ∆ ≤ 3qℓε, which together with (29) proves the lemma.
4.4.2 LWE Hardcore bit
The next step is to use Lemma 4.2 to obtain a form of the hardcore bit statement that is appropriate for our
purposes. We use the following notation: we write s ∈ {0, 1}n as s = (s0, s1), where s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1} n2 are
the n2 -bit prefix and suffix of s respectively (for simplicity, assume n is even; if not, ties can be broken arbi-
trarily). We will show computational indistinguishability based on the hardness assumption LWEℓ,q,D
Zq,BL
specified in Definition 2.5.
For reasons that will become clear in the next section, we consider procedures that output a tuple
(b, x, d, c) ∈ {0, 1} × X × {0, 1}w × {0, 1}.
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Lemma 4.6. Assume a choice of parameters satisfying the conditions (13). Assume the hardness assumption
LWEℓ,q,D
Zq,BL
holds. Let
A : Zm×nq ×Zmq → {0, 1} × X × {0, 1}w × {0, 1}
be a quantum polynomial-time procedure. For b ∈ {0, 1} and x ∈ X let Ib,x : {0, 1}w → {0, 1}n be an
efficiently computable map. For every s = (s0, s1) ∈ {0, 1}n and (b, x) ∈ {0, 1} × X , let Gˆsb⊕1,b,x ⊆
{0, 1}w be a set depending only on b, x and sb⊕1 and such that for all d ∈ Gˆsb⊕1,b,x the first (if b = 0) or
last (if b = 1) n2 bits of Ib,x(d) are not all 0. Then the distributions
D0 =
(
(A, As + e) ← GENFLWE(1λ), (b, x, d, c) ← A(A, As + e), Ib,x(d) · s mod 2
)
(33)
and
D1 =
(
(A, As + e) ← GENFLWE(1λ), (b, x, d, c) ← A(A, As + e), (δd∈Gˆsb⊕1,b,x r)⊕ (Ib,x(d) · s mod 2)
)
, (34)
where r ←U {0, 1} and δd∈Gˆsb⊕1,b,x is 1 if d ∈ Gˆsb⊕1,b,x and 0 otherwise, are computationally indistinguish-
able.
Proof. We prove computational indistinguishability by introducing a sequence of hybrids. For the first step
we let
D(1) =
(
(A˜, A˜s + e), (b, x, d, c) ← A(A˜, A˜s + e), Ib,x(d) · s mod 2
)
, (35)
where A˜ = BC + F ← LOSSY(1n, 1m, 1ℓ, q, D
Zq,BL) is sampled from a lossy sampler (see Definition 2.7).
From the definition, F ∈ Zm×nq has entries i.i.d. from the distribution DZq,BL over Zq. To see that D0
and D(1) are computationally indistinguishable, first note that the distribution of matrices A generated by
GENFLWE is negligibly far from the uniform distribution (see Theorem 2.6). Next, by Theorem 2.8, under
the LWEℓ,q,D
Zq,BL
assumption a uniformly random matrix A and a lossy matrix A˜ are computationally
indistinguishable. Note that this step, as well as subsequent steps, uses that A and Ib,x are efficiently
computable.
For the second step we remove the term Fs from the lossy LWE sample A˜s+ e to obtain the distribution
D(2) =
(
(BC + F, BCs + e), (b, x, d, c) ← A(BC + F, BCs + e), Ib,x(d) · s mod 2
)
. (36)
Using that s is binary and the entries of F are taken from a BL-bounded distribution, it follows that ‖Fs‖ ≤
n
√
mBL. Applying Lemma 2.4, the statistical distance between D
(1) and D(2) is at most
γ =
√
2
(
1− e
−2πmnBL
BV
)1/2
, (37)
which is negligible, due to the requirement that BVBL
is superpolynomial given in (13).
For the third step, observe that the distribution D(2) in (36) only depends on sb through Cs and Ib,x(d) · s,
where C is uniformly random. It follows from Lemma 4.2 that provided n2 = Ω(ℓ log q), with overwhelm-
ing probability over the choice of C, if we fix all variables except for sb, the distribution of (Ib,x(d) · s
mod 2) is statistically indistinguishable from r ←U {0, 1} as long as the n2 bits of Ib,x(d) associated with
22
sb are not all 0 (i.e. the first
n
2 bits if b = 0 or the last
n
2 bits if b = 1). Using that for d ∈ Gˆsb⊕1,b,x the n2 bits
of Ib,x(d) associated with sb are not all 0, the distribution D
(2) in (36) is statistically indistinguishable from
D(3) =
(
(BC + F, BCs + e), (b, x, d, c) ← A(BC + F, BCs + e), (δd∈Gˆsb⊕1,b,x r)⊕ (Ib,x(d) · s mod 2))
)
,
where r ←U {0, 1}.
For the fourth step we reinsert the term Fs to obtain
D(4) =
(
A˜, A˜s + e, (b, x, d, c) ← A(A˜, A˜s + e), (δd∈Gˆsb⊕1,b,x r)⊕ (Ib,x(d) · s mod 2)
)
.
Statistical indistinguishability between D(3) and D(4) follows similarly as between D(1) and D(2). Finally,
computational indistiguishability between D(4) and D1 follows similarly to between D
(1) and D0.
4.4.3 Adaptive hardcore lemma
We now prove that condition 4 of Definition 3.1 holds. Recall that X = Znq and w = n⌈log q⌉. Let
J : X → {0, 1}w be such that J(x) returns the binary representation of x ∈ X . For b ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ X ,
and d ∈ {0, 1}w , let Ib,x(d) ∈ {0, 1}n be the vector whose each coordinate is obtained by taking the inner
product mod 2 of the corresponding block of ⌈log q⌉ coordinates of d and of J(x)⊕ J(x− (−1)b1), where
1 ∈ Znq is the vector with all its coordinates equal to 1 ∈ Zq. For k = (A, As + e), b ∈ {0, 1} and x ∈ X ,
we define the set Gk,b,x as
Gk,b,x =
{
d ∈ {0, 1}w
∣∣∣ ∃i ∈ {b n
2
, . . . , b
n
2
+
n
2
}
: (Ib,x(d))i 6= 0
}
.
Observe that for all b ∈ {0, 1} and x ∈ X , if d is sampled uniformly at random, d /∈ Gk,b,x with negligible
probability. This follows simply because for any b ∈ {0, 1}, J(x)⊕ J(x − (−1)b1) is non-zero, since J is
injective. Observe also that checking membership in Gk,b,x is possible given only b, x. This shows condition
4.(a) in the adaptive hardcore bit condition in Definition 3.1.
Given (x0, x1) ∈ Rk (where k = (A, As + e)), recall from Section 4.2 that x1 = x0 − s. For conve-
nience we also introduce the following set, where y = fk,0(x0) = fk,1(x1):
Gˆs1,0,x0 = Gˆs0,1,x1 = Gk,0,x0 ∩ Gk,1,x1 . (38)
The motivation for using two different notation for the same set is to clarify that membership in the set can
be decided given (sb⊕1, b, xb), for either b ∈ {0, 1}. This point is important in the proof of Lemma 4.6.
The following lemma establishes item 4.(b) in Definition 3.1.
Lemma 4.7. Assume a choice of parameters satisfying the conditions (13). Assume the hardness assumption
LWEℓ,q,D
Zq,BL
holds. Let s ∈ {0, 1}n . Let 6
Hs =
{
(b, x, d, d · (J(x)⊕ J(x − (−1)bs))) | b ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ X , d ∈ Gˆsb⊕1,b,x
}
, (39)
Hs =
{
(b, x, d, c) | (b, x, d, c⊕ 1) ∈ Hs
}
. (40)
Then for any quantum polynomial-time procedure
A : Zm×nq ×Zmq → {0, 1} × X × {0, 1}w × {0, 1}
6We write the sets as Hs instead of Hk to emphasize the dependence on s.
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there exists a negligible function µ(λ) such that∣∣∣ Pr
(A,As+e)←GENFLWE (1λ)
[A(A, As + e) ∈ Hs]− Pr
(A,As+e)←GENFLWE (1λ)
[A(A, As + e) ∈ Hs]∣∣∣ ≤ µ(λ) .
(41)
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that there exists a quantum polynomial-time procedure A
such that the left-hand side of (41) is at least some non-negligible function η(λ). We derive a contradiction
by showing that the two distributions D0 and D1 in Lemma 4.6, for Ib,x defined at the start of this section
and Gˆsb⊕1,b,x defined in (38), are computationally distinguishable, giving a contradiction.
Let (A, As + e) ← GENFLWE(1λ) and (b, x, d, c) ← A(A, As + e). To link A to the distributions
in Lemma 4.6 we relate the inner product condition in (39) to an inner product dˆ · s of the form appearing
in (33), for dˆ = Ib,x(d) that can be computed efficiently from b, x and d. This is based on the following
claim.
Claim 4.8. For all b ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ X , d ∈ {0, 1}w and s ∈ {0, 1}n the following equality holds:
d · (J(x)⊕ J(x − (−1)bs) = Ib,x(d) · s . (42)
Moreover, the function Ib,x is efficiently computable given b, x.
Proof. We do the proof in case n = 1 and w = ⌈log q⌉, as the case of general n follows by linearity. In this
case s is a single bit. If s = 0 then both sides of (42) evaluate to zero, so the equality holds trivially. It then
suffices to define Ib,xb(d) so that the equation holds when s = 1. A choice of either of
I0,x0(d) = d · (J(x0)⊕ J(x0 − 1)) , I1,x1(d) = d · (J(x1)⊕ J(x1 + 1))
satisfies all requirements. It is clear from the definition of Ib,x that it can be computed efficiently given
b, x.
The procedure A, the function Ib,x defined at the start of this section and the sets Gˆsb⊕1,b,x in (38)
fully specify D0 and D1. To conclude we construct a distinguisher A′ between D0 and D1. Consider two
possible distinguishers, A′u for u ∈ {0, 1}. Given a sample w = ((A, As + e), (b, x, d, c), t), A′u returns 0
if c = t⊕ u, and 1 otherwise. First note that
∑
u∈{0,1}
∣∣∣ Pr
w←D0
[A′u(w) = 0]− Pr
w←D1
[A′u(w) = 0]∣∣∣
= ∑
u∈{0,1}
∣∣∣ Pr
w←D0
[A′u(w) = 0 ∧ d ∈ Gˆsb⊕1,b,x]− Prw←D1 [A′u(w) = 0 ∧ d ∈ Gˆsb⊕1,b,x]
∣∣∣ (43)
since if d /∈ Gˆsb⊕1,b,x the distributions D0 and D1 are identical by definition. Next, if the sample held by
A′u is from the distribution D0 and if (b, x, d, c) ∈ Hs, then by the definition of Hs and (42) it follows that
c = d · (J(x) ⊕ J(x − (−1)bs) = Ib,x(d) · s = t. If instead (b, x, d, c) ∈ Hs then c ⊕ 1 = d · (J(x) ⊕
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J(x − (−1)bs) = Ib,x(d) · s = t. The expression in (43) is thus equal to:
(43) =
∣∣∣ Pr
(A,As+e)←GENFLWE (1λ)
[A(A, As + e) ∈ Hs]− 1
2
Pr
w←D1
[
d ∈ Gˆsb⊕1,b,x
]∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣ Pr
(A,As+e)←GENFLWE (1λ)
[A(A, As + e) ∈ Hs]− 1
2
Pr
w←D1
[
d ∈ Gˆsb⊕1,b,x
]∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣ Pr
(A,As+e)←GENFLWE (1λ)
[A(A, As + e) ∈ Hs]− Pr
(A,As+e)←GENFLWE (1λ)
[A(A, As + e) ∈ Hs]∣∣∣
≥ η .
Therefore, at least one of A′0 or A′1 must successfully distinguish between D0 and D1 with advantage at
least
η
2 , a contradiction with the statement of Lemma 4.6.
5 Protocol description
We introduce two protocols. The first we call the (general) randomness expansion protocol, or Protocol 1.
This is our main randomness expansion protocol. It is introduced in Section 5.1, and summarized in Figure 1.
The protocol describes the interaction between a verifier and prover. Ultimately, we aim to obtain the
guarantee that any computationally bounded prover that is accepted with non-negligible probability by the
verifier in the protocol must generate transcripts that contain information-theoretic randomness.
The second protocol is called the simplified protocol, or Protocol 2. It is introduced in Section 5.2, and
summarized in Figure 2. This protocol abstracts some of the main features Protocol 1, and will be used as a
tool in the analysis (it is not meant to be executed literally).
5.1 The randomness expansion protocol
Our randomness expansion protocol, Protocol 1, is described in Figure 1. The protocol is parametrized by a
security parameter λ and a number of rounds N. The other parameters, the error tolerance parameter γ ≥ 0
and the testing parameter q ∈ (0, 1], are assumed to be specified as a function of λ and N. For intuition, γ
can be thought of as a small constant and q as a parameter that scales as poly(λ)/N.
At the start of the protocol, the verifier executes (k, tk) ← GENF (1λ) to obtain the public key k and
trapdoor tk for a pair of functions { fk,b : X → DY}b∈{0,1} from the NTCF family (see Definition 3.1). The
verifier sends the public key k to the prover and keeps the associated trapdoor private.
In each of the N rounds of the protocol, the prover is first required to provide a value y ∈ Y . For each
b ∈ {0, 1}, the verifier uses the trapdoor to compute xˆb ← INVF (tk, b, y). (If the inversion procedure fails,
the verifier requests another sample from the prover.) For convenience, introduce a set
Gˆy = Gk,0,x0 ∩ Gk,1,x1 , (44)
where for b ∈ {0, 1} the set Gk,b,xb is defined in 4.(a) of Definition 3.1. The verifier then chooses a round
type G ∈ {0, 1} according to a biased distribution: either a test round, G = 0, chosen with probability
Pr(G = 0) = q, or a generation round, G = 1, chosen with the remaining probability Pr(G = 1) = 1− q.
The former type of round is less frequent, as the parameter q will eventually be set to a very small value,
that goes to 0 with the number of rounds of the protocol. The prover is not told the round type.
Depending on the round type, the verifier chooses a challenge C ∈ {0, 1} that she sends to the prover.
In the case of a test round the challenge is chosen uniformly at random; in the case of a generation round
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the challenge is always C = 1. In case C = 0 the prover is asked to return a pair (u, d) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}w .
The pair is called valid if u = d · (J(xˆ0) ⊕ J(xˆ1)) and d ∈ Gˆy, where the function J is as in 4.(b) of
Definition 3.1. If d ∈ Gˆy, the verifier sets a decision bit W = 1 if the answer is valid, and W = 0 if not.
If d /∈ Gˆy, the verifier sets the decision bit W ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random.7 In case C = 1, the prover
should return a pair (b, x) ∈ {0, 1} × X . The pair is called valid if CHKF (k, b, x, y) = 1. The verifier sets
a decision bit W = 1 in case the pair is valid, and W = 0 otherwise. The set of valid pairs on challenge
C = c ∈ {0, 1} is denoted Vy,c.
After each test round the verifier samples a fresh (k, tk) ← GENF (1λ) and communicates the new
public key k to the prover.
At the end of the protocol, the verifier computes the fraction of test rounds in which the decision bit has
been set to 1. If this fraction is smaller than (1− γ), the verifier aborts. Otherwise, the verifier returns the
concatenation of the bits b obtained from the prover in generation rounds. (These bits are recorded in the
verifier’s output string O1 · · ·ON , such that Oi = 0 whenever the round is a test round.)
5.2 The simplified protocol
For purposes of analysis only we introduce a simplified variant of Protocol 1, which is specified in Figure 2.
We call it the simplified protocol, or Protocol 2. The protocol is very similar to the randomness expansion
protocol described in Figure 1, except that the prover’s answers and the verifier’s checks are simplified, and
in test rounds there is an additional challenge bit T ∈ {0, 1}. This new challenge asks the prover to perform
a projective measurement on its private space that indicates whether the state lies in a “good subspace”
(indicated by an outcome K = 0) or in the complementary “bad subspace” (outcome K = 1). The “good”
and “bad” subspaces represent portions of space where the device’s other two measurements, M and Π are
anti-aligned and aligned respectively; see the definition of a simplified device in Section 6.2 for details.
For the case of a challenge C = 0, in Protocol 1 the prover returns an equation (u, d). In the simplified
protocol the prover returns a single bit e ∈ {0, 1} that is meant to directly indicate the verifier’s decision
(i.e. the bit W). If moreover T = 1 the prover is required to reply with an additional bit k ∈ {0, 1}. In this
case, the verifier makes the decision to accept, i.e. sets W = 1, if and only if e = 1 and k = 0. For the case
of a challenge C = 1, in Protocol 1 the prover returns a pair (b, x). In the simplified protocol the prover
returns a value v ∈ {0, 1, 2} that is such that v = b in case (b, x) is valid, i.e. (b, x) ∈ Vy,1, and v = 2
otherwise.
Note that this “honest” behavior for the prover is not necessarily efficient. Moreover, it is easy for a
“malicious” prover to succeed in Protocol 2, e.g. by always returning u = 1 (valid equation), k = 0 (good
subspace) and v ∈ {0, 1} (valid pre-image). Our analysis will not consider arbitrary provers in Protocol 2,
but instead provers whose measurements satisfy certain constraints that arise from the analysis of Protocol 1.
For such provers, it will be impossible to succeed in the simplified protocol without generating randomness.
Further details are given in Section 7.
5.3 Completeness
We describe the intended behavior for the prover in Protocol 1. Fix an NTCF family F and a key k ∈ KF .
In each round, the “honest” prover performs the following actions.
7This choice if made for technical reasons that have to do with the definition of the adaptive hardcore bit property; see Section 7
and the proof of Proposition 7.4 for details.
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Let λ be a security parameter, N ≥ 1 a number of rounds, and γ, q > 0 functions of λ and N. Let F be an
NTCF family.
At the start of the protocol, the verifier communicates N to the prover. In addition, the verifier samples an
initial key (k, tk) ← GENF (1λ), sends k to the prover and keeps the trapdoor information tk private.
1. For i = 1, . . . , N:
(a) The prover returns a y ∈ Y to the verifier. For b ∈ {0, 1} the verifier uses the trapdoor to
compute xˆb ← INVF (tk, b, y).
(b) The verifier selects a round type Gi ∈ {0, 1} according to a Bernoulli distribution with parameter
q: Pr(Gi = 0) = q and Pr(Gi = 1) = 1 − q. In case Gi = 0 (test round), she chooses
a challenge Ci ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random. In case Gi = 1 (generation round), she sets
Ci = 1. The verifier keeps Gi private, and sends Ci to the prover.
i. In case Ci = 0 the prover returns (u, d) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}w . If d /∈ Gˆy, the set defined
in (44), the verifier sets W to a uniformly random bit. Otherwise, the verifier sets W = 1 if
d · (J(xˆ0)⊕ J(xˆ1)) = u and W = 0 if not.
ii. In case Ci = 1 the prover returns (b, x) ∈ {0, 1} × X . The verifier sets W as the value
returned by CHKF (k, b, x, y).
(c) In case Gi = 1, the verifier sets Oi = b. In case Gi = 0, she sets Wi = W.
(d) In case Gi = 0, the verifier samples a new key (k, tk) ← GENF (1λ). She sends k to the prover
and keeps the trapdoor information tk private. This key will be used until the next test round,
included.
2. If ∑i:Gi=0 Wi < (1 − γ)qN, the verifier aborts. Otherwise, she returns the string O obtained by
concatenating the bits Oi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that Gi = 1.
Figure 1: The randomness expansion protocol, Protocol 1. See Definition 3.1 for notation associated with
the NTCF family F .
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Let λ be a security parameter, N ≥ 1 a number of rounds, and γ, η, κ, q > 0 functions of λ and N.
1. For i = 1, . . . , N:
(a) The verifier selects a round type Gi ∈ {0, 1} according to a Bernoulli distribution with parameter
q: Pr(Gi = 0) = q and Pr(Gi = 1) = 1− q. In case Gi = 0 (test round), she chooses Ci ∈
{0, 1} uniformly at random and Ti ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr(Ti = 0) = 1− κ and Pr(Ti = 1) = κ.
In case Gi = 1 (generation round), she sets Ci = 1 and Ti = 0. The verifier keeps Gi private,
and sends (Ci, Ti) to the prover.
i. In case Ci = 0 the prover returns e ∈ {0, 1}. If Ti = 1 the prover in addition reports
k ∈ {0, 1}.8 If Ti = 0 the verifier sets Wi = e. If Ti = 1 the verifier sets Wi = e(1− k).
ii. In case Ci = 1 the prover returns v ∈ {0, 1, 2}. The verifier sets Oi = v and Wi = 1v∈{0,1}.
2. If ∑i:Gi=0∧Ti=1 Wi < (1− γκ − η)κqN, the verifier rejects the interaction. Otherwise, she returns the
string O obtained by concatenating the bits Oi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that Gi = 1.
Figure 2: The simplified protocol, Protocol 2.
1. The prover executes the efficient procedure SAMPF in superposition to obtain the state
|ψ(1)〉 = 1√|X | ∑x∈X ,y∈Y ,b∈{0,1}
√
( f ′k,b(x))(y)|b, x〉|y〉 .
2. The prover measures the last register to obtain an y ∈ Y . Using item 2. from the definition of an
NTCF, the prover’s re-normalized post-measurement state is
|ψ(2)〉 = 1√
2
(|0, x0〉+ |1, x1〉)|y〉 ,
where for b ∈ {0, 1}, xb = INVF (tk, b, y).
(a) In case Ci = 0, the prover evaluates the function J on the second register, containing xb, and
then applies a Hadamard transform to all w + 1 qubits in the first two registers. Tracing out the
register that contains y, this yields the state
|ψ(3)〉 = 2− w+22 ∑
d,b,u
(−1)d·J(xb)⊕ub|u〉|d〉
= (−1)J(x0)2− w2 ∑
d∈{0,1}w
|d · (J(x0)⊕ J(x1))〉|d〉 .
The prover measures both registers to obtain an (u, d) that it sends back to the verifier.
(b) In case Ci = 1, the prover measures the first two registers of |ψ(2)〉 in the computational basis,
and returns the outcome (b, xb) to the verifier.
8The bit k should not be confused with the public key k for the NTCF that is used in Protocol 1. In Protocol 2, there is no NTCF,
and no key.
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Lemma 5.1. For any λ and k ← GENF (1λ), the strategy for the honest prover (on input k) in one round of
the protocol can be implemented in time polynomial in λ and is accepted with probability negligibly close
to 1.
Proof. Both efficiency and correctness of the prover follow from the definition of an NTCF (Definition 3.1).
The prover fails only if it obtains an outcome d /∈ Gˆy, which by item 4(a) in the definition happens with
negligible probability.
6 Devices
We model an arbitrary prover in the randomness expansion protocol (Protocol 1 in Figure 1) as a device that
implements the actions of the prover: the device first returns an y ∈ Y ; then, depending on the challenge
C ∈ {0, 1}, it either returns an equation (u, d) (case C = 0), or a candidate pre-image (b, x) (case C = 1).
For simplicity we assume that the device makes the same set of measurements in each round of the protocol.
This is without loss of generality, as we allow the state of the device to change from one round to the next;
in particular the device is allowed to use a quantum memory as a control register for the measurements.
In Section 6.1 we introduce our notation for modeling provers in Protocol 1 as devices. In Section 6.2
we consider a simplified form of device, that is appropriate for modeling a prover in the simplified protocol,
Protocol 2. In Section 7 we give a reduction showing how to associate a specific simplified device to any
computationally efficient general device, such that the randomness generation properties of the two devices
can be related to each other (this is done in Section 8).
For the remainder of this section we fix an NTCF family F satisfying the conditions of Definition 3.1,
and use notation introduced in the definition.
6.1 General devices
The following notion of device models the behavior of an arbitrary prover in the randomness expansion
protocol, Protocol 1 (Figure 1).
Definition 6.1. Given k ∈ KF , a device D = (φ, Π, M) (implicitly, compatible with k) is specified by the
following:
1. A (not necessarily normalized) positive semidefinite φ ∈ Pos(HD ⊗HY). Here HD is an arbitrary
space private to the device, and HY is a space of the same dimension as the cardinality of the set Y ,
also private to the device. For every y ∈ Y , define
φy = (IdD ⊗〈y|Y) φ (IdD ⊗|y〉Y) ∈ Pos(HD) .
Note that φy is not normalized, and ∑y∈Y Tr(φy) = Tr(φ).
2. For every y ∈ Y , a projective measurement {M(u,d)y } on HD, with outcomes (u, d) ∈ {0, 1} ×
{0, 1}w .
3. For every y ∈ Y , a projective measurement {Π(b,x)y } on HD, with outcomes (b, x) ∈ {0, 1} × X .
For each y, this measurement has two designated outcomes (0, x0) and (1, x1), which are the answers
that are accepted on challenge C = 1 in the protocol; recall that we use the notation Vy,1 for this set.
For b ∈ {0, 1} we use the shorthand Πby = Π(b,xb)y , Πy = Π0y + Π1y, and Π2y = Id−Π0y −Π1y.
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ByNaimark’s theorem, up to increasing the dimension ofHD the assumption that {Π(b,x)y } and {M(u,d)y }
are projective is without loss of generality.
We explain the connection between the notion of device in Definition 6.1 and a prover in Protocol 1.
Given a device D = (φ, Π, M), we can define actions for the prover in Protocol 1 as follows. The prover
is initialized in state φ. When a round of the protocol is initiated, the prover measures register Y in the
computational basis and returns the outcome y ∈ Y . We always assume that the prover directly measures
the register, as any pre-processing unitary can be incorporated in the definition of the state φ. When sent
challenge C = 0 (resp. C = 1), the prover measures register D using the device’s projective measurement
{M(u,d)y } (resp. {Π(b,x)y }), and returns the outcome to the verifier.
Definition 6.2. We say that a device D = (φ, Π, M) is efficient if
1. There is a polynomial-size circuit to prepare φ, given the NTCF key k;
2. For every y ∈ Y , the measurements {M(u,d)y } and {Π(b,x)y } can be implemented by polynomial-size
circuits.
Using the definition of an NTCF family (Definition 3.1), it is straightforward to verify that the device
associated with the “honest” prover described in Section 5.3 is efficient.
We introduce notation related to the post-measurement states generated by a device in Protocol 1. An
execution of Protocol 1 involves a choice of round types g ∈ {0, 1}N and challenges c ∈ {0, 1}N by the
verifier, and a sequence of outputs o ∈ {0, 1, 2}N computed by the verifier as a function of the answers
provided by the device. Here, in case g = 0 (test round) we use o ∈ {0, 1} to denote the outcome of
the test (called W in the protocol description), and in case g = 1 (generation round) we use o ∈ {0, 1, 2}
such that o = 2 in case W = 0, and o = O as recorded by the verifier in case W = 1. We call the tuple
(g, c, o) the transcript of the protocol; it contains all the information relevant to the verifier’s final acceptance
decision and to the extraction of randomness. Additional information such as the choice of NTCF key and
the prover’s complete answers (including the value y) is discarded for ease of presentation. We let ACC
denote the set of transcripts (g, c, o) that are accepted by the verifier in the last step of the protocol, i.e. such
that ∑i:gi=0 oi ≥ (1− γ)qN.
Definition 6.3. Let D = (φ, Π, M) be a device. For any transcript (g, c, o) for an execution of Protocol 1
with D, let φco
D
be the post-measurement state of the device, conditioned on having received challenges c
and returned outcomes o. The joint state of the transcript and the device at the end of the N rounds (but
before the verifier’s decision to abort) is
φ
(N)
COD
= ∑
g,c,o
q(g, c) |c〉〈c|C ⊗ |o〉〈o|O ⊗ φcoD , (45)
where q(g, c) is the probability that the sequence of round types and challenges (g, c) is chosen by the
verifier in the protocol.
We write |φ〉DE for a purification of the initial state φD of the device, with E the purifying register, and
ρco
E
for the post-measurement state on register E conditioned on the transcript being (c, o).
6.2 Simplified devices
Next we introduce a simplified notion of device, that can be used to model the actions of a prover in the
simplified protocol, Protocol 2 (Figure 2).
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Definition 6.4. A simplified device is a tuple (φ, Π, M, K) such that:
1. φ = {φy}y∈Y ⊆ Pos(HD) is a family of positive semidefinite operators on an arbitrary space HD;
2. For each y ∈ Y , {M0y, M1y = Id−M0y}, {Π0y, Π1y, Π2y = Id−Π0y − Π1y}, and {K0y, K1y = Id−K0y}
are projective measurements on HD;
3. For each y ∈ Y , the measurement operators Ky commute with the My and with the Πy. (My and Πy
do not necessarily commute with each other.)
We introduce a quantity called overlap that measures how “incompatible” a simplified device’s mea-
surements are. This measure is analogous to the measure of overlap used to quantify incompatibility in the
derivation of entropic uncertainty relations (see e.g. [MU88]).
Definition 6.5. Given a simplified device D = (φ, Π, M, K), the overlap of D is
∆(D) = max
y∈Y
∥∥K0y(Π0yM1yΠ0y + Π1yM1yΠ1y)∥∥ .
Note that the overlap only quantifies the measurement incompatibility in the “good subspace” K0y.
To any simplified device D = (φ, Π, M, K) we associate the post-measurement states
∀e ∈ {0, 1}, φe00 = ∑
y∈Y
|y〉〈y| ⊗ MeyφyMey ,
∀e, k ∈ {0, 1}, φek01 = ∑
y∈Y
|y〉〈y| ⊗ KkyMeyφyMeyKky ,
∀v ∈ {0, 1, 2}, φv1 = ∑
y∈Y
|y〉〈y| ⊗ΠvyφyΠvy . (46)
A simplified device can be used in the simplified protocol in a straightforward way: upon receipt of a
challenge C = 0 (resp. C = 1), the device first samples an y ∈ Y according to the distribution with weights
Tr(φy). It then performs the projective measurement {M0y, M1y} followed by, if T = 1, {K0y, K1y} (resp.
{Π0y, Π1y, Π2y}) on φy, and returns the outcomes e, k ∈ {0, 1} (resp. v ∈ {0, 1, 2}) to the verifier.
Definition 6.6. Let D = (φ, Π, M, K) be a simplified device. For any transcript (g, c, t, o, k) for an exe-
cution of Protocol 1 with D, let φctok
D
be the post-measurement state of the device, conditioned on having
received challenges (c, t) and returned outcomes (o, k). The joint state of the transcript and the device at the
end of the N rounds (but before the verifier’s decision to abort) of the protocol is
φ
(N)
CTOKD
= ∑
g,c,t,o,k
q(g, c, t) |c, t〉〈c, t|CT ⊗ |o, k〉〈o, k|OK ⊗ φctokD , (47)
where q(g, c, t) = q(g, c)κ(t) with κ(t) = ∏i κ
ti(1− κ)1−ti is the probability that the sequence of round
types and challenges (g, c, t) is chosen by the verifier in the protocol.
7 Single-round analysis
In this section we consider the behavior of an arbitrary device D in a single round of the randomness ex-
pansion protocol, Protocol 1 in Figure 1. Our goal is to introduce a simplified device D′ such that analyzing
31
the randomness generation properties of D′ is easier than it is for D, and such that bounds on the amount of
randomness generated by D′ in the simplified protocol, Protocol 2 in Figure 2, imply bounds on the amount
of randomness generated by D in Protocol 1. Throughout the section we fix an NTCF family F (Defini-
tion 3.1) and a key k ∈ KF sampled according to GEN(1λ), for a parameter λ that plays the role of security
parameter.
7.1 A constraint on the measurements of any efficient device
We start with a lemma showing that for any efficient device D = (φ, Π, M), the measurements Π and M
must be strongly incompatible, in the sense that if the device first measures Π, and then measures M, it is
unable to determine if the pair (u, d) returned by M corresponds to a valid pair, i.e. (u, d) ∈ Vy,0. Indeed,
if this were the case the device could be used to violate the hardcore bit property (12). Recall the definition
of the set Gˆy ⊆ {0, 1}w in (44).
Lemma 7.1. Let D = (φ, Π, M) be an efficient device. Define a sub-normalized density
φ˜YBXD = ∑
y∈Y
|y〉〈y|Y ⊗ ∑
b∈{0,1}
|b, xb〉〈b, xb|BX ⊗Π(b,xb)y φy Π(b,xb)y
= ∑
b∈{0,1}
|b, xb〉〈b, xb|BX ⊗ φ˜(b)YD . (48)
Let
σ0 = ∑
b∈{0,1}
|b, xb〉〈b, xb|BX ⊗ ∑
(u,d)∈Vy,0
|u, d〉〈u, d|U ⊗ (IdY⊗M(u,d)y )φ˜(b)YD(IdY ⊗M(u,d)y ) ,
σ1 = ∑
b∈{0,1}
|b, xb〉〈b, xb|BX ⊗ ∑
(u,d)/∈Vy,0
1d∈Gˆy |u, d〉〈u, d|U ⊗ (IdY⊗M
(u,d)
y )φ˜
(b)
YD
(IdY ⊗M(u,d)y ) . (49)
Then σ0 and σ1 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that there exists an efficient observable O such that
Tr(O(σ0 − σ1)) ≥ µ , (50)
for some non-negligible function µ(λ). Consider the following efficient procedure. The procedure first
prepares the state φ˜YBXD in (48). This can be done efficiently by first preparing φYD, then measuring a
y ∈ Y , then applying the measurement {Π(b,x)y } to φy, and returning a special abort symbol if the outcome
is invalid, i.e. CHKF (k, b, x, y) = 0.
The procedure then applies the measurement {M(u,d)y } to φ˜YBXD, obtaining an outcome (u, d). At this
point, conditioned on the event that d ∈ Gˆy, depending on whether (u, d) ∈ Vy,0 or (u, d) /∈ Vy,0 the
procedure has either prepared σ0 or σ1. Finally, the procedure measures O to obtain a bit v, and returns
(b, x, d, v ⊕ u). This defines an efficient procedure. Moreover, using (50) it follows that the procedure
violates the hardcore bit property (12). (The cases where d /∈ Gˆy are not taken into account by the hardcore
bit property, so it is sufficient to have a good distinguishing ability conditioned on d ∈ Gˆy.)
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7.2 Angles between incompatible measurements
We show a general lemma that argues about the principal angles between two binary-outcome measurements
that have a certain form of incompatibility.
Lemma 7.2. Let Π, M be two orthogonal projections onH and φ a state on H. Let γ = 1− Tr(Mφ) and
µ =
∣∣∣1
2
− Tr(MΠφΠ)− Tr(M(Id−Π)φ(Id−Π))∣∣∣ .
Let 12 < ω ≤ 1. Let K be the orthogonal projection on the direct sum of eigenspaces of ΠMΠ +
(Id−Π)M(Id−Π) with associated eigenvalue in [1−ω,ω]. Then
Tr
(
(Id−K)φ) ≤ 2µ+ 10√γ
1− 4ω(1− ω) .
Proof. Using Jordan’s lemma we find a basis ofH in which
M = ⊕j
(
c2j cjsj
cjsj s
2
j
)
and Π = ⊕j
(
1 0
0 0
)
, (51)
where cj = cos θj, sj = sin θj, for some angles θj. There may be 1-dimensional blocks in the Jordan
decomposition, but up to adding a few dimensions these can be identified with two-dimensional blocks such
that c2j ∈ {0, 1}. Let K be the orthogonal projection on those 2-dimensional blocks such that min(c2j , s2j ) ≥
1− ω. Note that K commutes with both M and Π, but not necessarily with φ. It is easy to verify that this
definition of K coincides with the definition given in the lemma.
Suppose first that γ = 0. Then φ is supported on the range of M. For any block j, let Pj be the projection
on the block and αj = Tr(Pjφ). It follows from the decomposition in (51) and the definition of µ that∣∣∣1
2
−∑
j
αj
(
c4j + s
4
j
)∣∣∣ ≤ µ . (52)
Using that for j such that min(c2j , s
2
j ) ≥ 1− ω we have
c4j + s
4
j = 1− 2 max(c2j , s2j )
(
1−max(c2j , s2j )
) ≥ 1
2
+
(1
2
− 2ω(1− ω)
)
,
and c4j + s
4
j ≥ 12 always, it follows from (52) that for any ω > 12 ,
Tr
(
(Id−K)φ) ≤ 2µ
1− 4ω(1− ω) . (53)
Next consider the case where γ > 0. Assume Tr(Mφ) > 0, as otherwise the lemma is trivial. Let
φ′ = MφM/Tr(Mφ). By the gentle measurement lemma (see e.g. [Wil13, Lemma 9.4.1]),∥∥φ′ − φ∥∥
1
≤ 2√γ . (54)
Using the definition of µ, it follows that∣∣∣1
2
− Tr(MΠφ′Π)− Tr(M(Id−Π)φ′(Id−Π))∣∣∣ ≤ µ+ 4√γ .
Applying the same reasoning as for the case γ = 0 yields an analogue of (53), with φ′ instead of φ on the
left-hand side and µ+ 4
√
γ instead of µ on the right-hand side. Finally, using again (54) the same bound
transfers to φ up to an additional loss of 2
√
γ.
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7.3 Simulating an efficient device using a simplified device
Recall the definitions of a simplified device (Definition 6.4) and of the overlap of a simplified device
(Definition 6.5). Recall also the definition of post-measurement states {φco} associated with a device
D = (φ, Π, M) given in Definition 6.3, and of post-measurement states {(φ′)ctok} associated with a sim-
plified device D′ = (φ′, Π′, M′, K) given in Definition 6.6. These ensembles of states provide a means to
meaningfully compare a device D and a simplified device D′. We record this in the following definition.
Definition 7.3. Let D = (φ, Π, M) be a device and D′ = (φ′, Π′, M′, K) a simplified device. We say
that D′ simulates D if for every (c, o) ∈ {0, 1}N × {0, 1, 2}N and t = 0N the states φco and (φ′)cto are
identical.
The following proposition shows that any efficient device can be simulated by a simplified device whose
measurements generally make an angle that is bounded away from 1. As in Lemma 7.1, the only assumption
required on the efficient device is that it does not break the hardcore bit property (12).
Proposition 7.4. Let D = (φ, Π, M) be an efficient device and 12 < ω ≤ 1. Then there is a (not necessarily
efficient) simplified device D˜ = (φ, Π˜, M˜, K) such that the following hold:
1. D˜ has overlap ∆(D˜) ≤ ω;
2. The simplified device D˜ simulates the device D;
3. For any advice states φ′ = {φ′y} that are independent from the key k ∈ KF (see Definition 2.5) it
holds that
∑
y
Tr(K1yφ
′
y) ≤ C
√
∑
y
Tr(M˜1yφ
′
y) + negl(λ) , (55)
where C > 0 is a constant depending only on ω.
Proof. For each y ∈ Y let
Mˆy = ∑
(u,d): d/∈Gˆy
M
(u,d)
y , My = ∑
(u,d)∈Vy,0
M
(u,d)
y +
1
2
Mˆy ,
and for b ∈ {0, 1}, Πby = Π(b,xb)y . By introducing an isometry Uy : HD → HD′ into a larger space,
we can embed My into a projection My such that My = U†y MyUy. For b ∈ {0, 1} let Πby be such that
U†yΠ
b
yUy = Π
b
y.
The device D˜ is defined as follows. The device first measures an y ∈ Y exactly as D would. It then
applies the isometry Uy. This defines the states {φ′y}.
• The measurement {M˜0y, M˜1y} is defined as follows. The device coherently performs the measurement
{M(u,d)y }. If d /∈ Gˆy the device returns a random outcome. Otherwise, if (u, d) ∈ Vy,0 it returns a 0,
and 1 if not.
• The measurement {Π˜0y, Π˜1y, Π˜2y} is defined as follows. The device first coherently performs the mea-
surement {Π(b,x)y }. If an outcome (b, x) ∈ Vy,1 is obtained the device returns v = b. Otherwise the
device returns v = 2.
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• Let Ky be the projection obtained by applying Lemma 7.2 to the projections Π = Π0y and M = My
and the state
φ =
(Π
0
y + Π
1
y)φ
′
y(Π
0
y + Π
1
y)
Tr
(
(Π
0
y + Π
1
y)φ
′
y
) .
The measurement {K0y, K1y} is defined by setting
K0y = (Π
0
y + Π
1
y)K + (Id−Π0y −Π1y) and K1y = (Π0y + Π1y)(Id−K) .
The first two conditions on D′ claimed in the lemma follow by definition. The overlap property holds
by definition of K0y. For the simulation property, note that it is possible for D
′ to further measure the post-
measurement states to locally obtain an equation, or a pre-image, as D would have; this guarantees that the
post-measurement states of the two devices are identical in each round.
It remains to show the third item. It follows from computational indistinguishability of σ0 and σ1 shown
in Lemma 7.1 that both operators have a trace that is within negligible of each other. Using the notation
introduced here, and in particular the definition of My, this implies that the difference∣∣∣ ∑
b∈{0,1}
Tr
(
MyΠ
b
yφ
′
yΠ
b
y
)− ∑
b∈{0,1}
Tr
(
(Id−My)Πbyφ′yΠby
)∣∣∣
is negligible. Since the two expressions sum to Tr((Id−Π2y)φ′y), it follows that, letting
φ˜y =
(Id−Π2y)φ′y(Id−Π2y)
Tr((Id−Π2y)φ′y)
, (56)
we get that
Tr(MyΠ
0
yφ˜yΠ
0
y) + Tr(MyΠ
1
yφ˜yΠ
1
y)
is within negligible of 12 . To conclude we apply Lemma 7.2 to the operators Π = Π
0
and M = My. The
conclusion of the lemma gives that
Tr
(
(Id−Ky)φ˜y
) ≤ C√Tr((Id−M˜0y)φ˜y) + negl(λ) , (57)
for some universal constant C (depending on ω). Using the definition (56) of φ˜y and Tr((Id−Π2y)φy) ≤
1, (57) implies
Tr
(
K1yφ
′
y
) ≤ C√Tr((Id−M˜0y)φ′y) + negl(λ) .
Summing this bound over all y and using concavity of the square root concludes the proof.
8 Accumulating randomness across multiple rounds
To analyze the randomness generated by a device in the randomness expansion protocol we proceed in
two steps. First, we show that the randomness generated by the device can be related to the randomness
generated by the simplified device D˜ that is associated to it by Proposition 7.4, when it is used as a device
in the simplified protocol, Protocol 2. This is done in Section 8.1. Then, in Section 8.2 we analyze the
randomness generated in a single round of the simplified protocol, and in Section 8.3 we analyze multiple
rounds of the protocol.
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8.1 Reduction to the simplified protocol
Let D = (φ, Π, M, K) be a simplified device. The main difference between the behavior of the simplified
device and the original device it is derived from is that the simplified device (sometimes) performs an
additional projective measurement {K0, K1}, in addition to the “equation” measurement {M0, M1}. (Recall
that in protocol 2, the device performs the measurement whenever the verifier sends a challenge bit T = 1,
which happens with probability Pr(T = 1) = κ in the test rounds.)
In order to analyze the randomness generated by the original device in Protocol 1, it will be convenient
to obtain the guarantee that, in most test rounds of Protocol 1, the state of the device lies largely within the
“good subspace” K = K0. Recall the definition of the states {φctok} associated with the simplified device
in Definition 6.6. Let
|φco〉 = ∑
k
|φctok〉 = ∑
k
Pokct |φ〉 , (58)
where Pkoct is notation for the operator that corresponds to applying the device’s (projective) measurement
operators M, Π and K indicated by c and t respectively, and obtaining the sequence of outcomes o and k
respectively. The fact that |φco〉 does not depend on t is justified by the fact that {K, Id−K} is a projective
measurement.
Our goal is to bound the contribution to (58) of terms Pokct |φ〉 that correspond to a large fraction of
(Id−K) (“bad subspace”) outcomes, i.e. such that the Hamming weight |k| of the string k is large. Estab-
lishing the right bound is made delicate by the possibility of interference between the branches. We first
state and prove a general lemma, and then show how the lemma can be applied in our context.
Lemma 8.1. Let n be an integer, 0 < κ < 1, and T = (T1, . . . , Tn) a sequence of independent Bernoulli
random variables such that for any t ∈ {0, 1}n , Pr(T = t) = κ(t) = ∏i κti(1 − κ)1−ti . Let M =
(M1, . . . , Mn) and K = (K1, . . . , K|T|) be arbitrary sequences of random variables over {0, 1}, that may
be correlated between themselves and with T. For an integer i ∈ {1, . . . , n} write (T, M, K)<i for the triple
formed by the length-(i − 1) prefixes of T and M, and the length-|T<i | prefix of K.9
Assume that there is a monotone concave function g : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that g(0) = 0, g(x) ≥ x for
all x ∈ [0, 1], and for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and any sequences t, m ∈ {0, 1}i and k ∈ {0, 1}|t| it holds that
Pr
(
K|t|+1 = 1
∣∣ (T, M, K)<i = (t, m, k), Ti+1 = 1)
≤ g
(
Pr
(
Mi+1 = 0
∣∣ (T, M, K)<i = (t, m, k), Ti+1 = 1)) . (59)
Then for any 0 < γ, κ, η < 1 such that g(c1(
√
κ + γ/κ)) ≤ c2η for large enough constants c1, c2 > 0,
∑
t∈{0,1}n
κ(t) ∑
m: |m|≥(1−γ)n
(
∑
k: |k|>ηκn
√
Pr
(
(T, M, K) = (t, m, k)
))2 ≤ C0 2−κn , (60)
where C0 > 0 is a constant depending on γ, κ, η.
Intuitively, the lemma holds because the condition |m| ≥ (1− γ)n ensures that the outcome Mi = 0
is fairly unlikely, in which case (59) implies that whenever Ti = 1 the outcome Kj = 1, where j is the
number of nonzero entries of T in indices less or equal to i, should also be unlikely. The proof is made a
little difficult by the square roots, whose presence is motivated by the application to norms of quantum states
9Recall that we write |T| for the Hamming weight of the string T. Here, we think of each Kj as a random variable that is
correlated with the random variable Mi, where i is the index of the j-th non-zero entry of T.
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detailed later. Nevertheless, to understand the statement of the lemma it may be useful to consider the case
when all Mi (resp. Kj) are independent and identically distributed, and the square root and the square are
not present. In this case, the lemma reduces to showing that if
G =
{
m ∈ {0, 1}n : |m| ≥ (1− γ)n
}
, B =
{
(t, m) ∈ {0, 1}2n , k ∈ {0, 1}|t| : |k| ≥ ηκn
}
, (61)
then Pr(G ∧ B) ≤ C02−κn. As a first step, note that we may safely assume that Pr(Mi = 0) ≤ 2γ, as
otherwise by a Chernoff bound Pr(G) ≤ e−Ω(η2n) ≤ C02−κn provided η2 ≫ κ. Using (59) it follows that
Pr(Kj = 1) ≤ g(2γ), so that applying Bennett’s inequality,
Pr(B) ≤ e−Ω(h(η/g(2γ))κn) ≤ C0 2−κn ,
where h(x) = (1 + u) log(1 + u)− u and the second inequality holds provided η ≫ g(2γ). This com-
pletes the argument. To extend it to the general case, we use two tail bounds for martingales that replace the
use of the Chernoff bound and Bennett’s inequality respectively. The first is Azuma’s inequality.
Theorem 8.2 (Azuma’s inequality). Let (ξi,Fi)0≤i≤n be a martingale difference sequence such that ξ0 = 0
and ξi ≤ 1 for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then for any t ≥ 0,
Pr
(∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
ξi
∣∣∣ ≥ tn) ≤ 2e− t22 n .
The second is a version of Bennett’s inequality for martingales.
Theorem 8.3 (Corollary 2.2 in [FGL12]). Let (ξi,Fi)0≤i≤n be a supermartingale difference sequence such
that ξ0 = 0 and ξi ≤ 1 for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let
Xn =
n
∑
i=1
ξi and 〈X〉n =
n
∑
i=1
E
[
ξ2i
∣∣Fi−1] .
Then for any t ≥ 0 and v > 0,
Pr
(∣∣Xn∣∣ ≥ tn and 〈X〉n ≤ v2n) ≤ e− t2 arcsinh( t2v2 )n .
We give the proof of Lemma 8.1.
Proof of Lemma 8.1. We reduce the proof of (60) to a sequence of martingale tail bounds. Define a filtration
(F1, . . . ,Fi, . . . ,Fn) where Fi is the σ-algebra generated by (M, T, K)i. Let F<i = ∩j<iFj. Recall the
definition of the events G and B in (61). The proof proceeds in 3 steps.
First step: conditional expectations of M. [Uses the assumption: δ21 ≫ κ.]
For i ∈ {1, . . . , n} let Zi = Mi − E[Mi|F<i] and Wi = Z1 + · · ·+ Zi. Then the sequence (W1, . . . , Wn)
is a martingale such that |Wi −Wi−1| ≤ 1. Applying Azuma’s inequality, it follows that for any δ1 > 0,
Pr
(∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
Zi
∣∣∣ ≥ δ1n) ≤ 2 e− δ212 n . (62)
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Let δ1 > 0 be large enough such that the right-hand side of (62) is less than 2
−(C+1)κn, for some constant C
to be determined below. Let δ′1 = δ1 + γ and
B′ =
{
(t, m, k) :
n
∑
i=1
E
[
Mi
∣∣ (T, M, K)<i = (t, m, k)<i] ≤ (1− δ′1)n} .
Then,
∑
m∈G
∑
t
κ(t)
(
∑
k:(t,m,k)∈B′
√
Pr
(
(M, K) = (m, k)|T = t))2
≤ 2Cκn
(
∑
m∈G
∑
t,k: (t,m,k)∈B′
Pr
(
(T, M, K) = (t, m, k)
))
+ 2−κn
≤ 2 · 2−κn , (63)
where the first inequality uses the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the fact that by the Chernoff bound, for
C large enough, ∑|t|≥Cκn κ(t)2|t| ≤ 2−κn, and the second inequality follows from (62) since the event that
m ∈ G and (t, m, k) ∈ B′ implies |∑ Zi| ≥ δ1n.
Second step: conditional expectations of T(1− M). [Uses the assumption: δ′1 ≪ δ2.]
For i ∈ {1, . . . , n} let Z′i = Ti(1−Mi)−E [Ti(1−Mi)|F<i] and W ′i = Z′1 + · · ·+Z′i . Then the sequence
(W ′1, . . . , W
′
n) is a martingale such that |W ′i −W ′i−1| ≤ 1. Let v2Z′ = ∑i E [|Z′i |2|F<i]. For (t, m, k) /∈ B′,
using that Ti is independent from Mi and E [Ti] = κ it holds that v
2
Z′ ≤ δ′1κn. Let v2 = δ′1κn. Applying
Theorem 8.3, for any δ2 > 0,
Pr
(∣∣∣∑ Z′i ∣∣∣ ≥ δ2κn ∧ v2Z′ ≤ v2n) ≤ e− 12 δ2κ arcsinh
(
δ2
2δ′
1
)
n
. (64)
Assume δ′1 small enough, as a function of δ2, such that the right-hand side in (64) is less than 2
−(C+1)κn.
Let δ′2 = δ2 + γ/κ and
B′′ =
{
(t, m, k) /∈ B′ : ∑
i
E
[
Ti(1− Mi)
∣∣ (T, M, K)<i = (t, m, k)<i] ≥ δ′2κn} .
Then similarly to (63) we get
∑
m∈G
∑
t
κ(t)
(
∑
k:(t,m,k)∈B′′
√
Pr
(
(M, K) = (m, k)|T = t))2 ≤ 2−κn . (65)
Third step: conditional expectations of T(1− M)K. [Uses the assumption: g(δ′2) ≪ δ3.]
Using assumption (59) and concavity of g, for any (t, m, k) /∈ (B′′ ∪ B′) it holds that
∑
i
E
[
Ti(1− Mi)Ki
∣∣ (T, M, K)<i = (t, m, k)<i] ≤ g(δ′2)κn . (66)
For i ∈ {1, . . . , n} let Z′′i = Ti(1− Mi)Ki − E [Ti(1− Mi)Ki|F<i] and W ′′i = Z′′1 + · · ·+ Z′′i . Then the
sequence (W ′′1 , . . . , W
′′
n ) is a martingale such that |W ′′i −W ′′i−1| ≤ 1 and by (66), v2Z′′ = ∑i E[|Z′′i |2|F<i] ≤
g(δ′2)κn. Applying Theorem 8.3 once more, for any δ3 > 0,
Pr
(∣∣∣∑ Z′′i ∣∣∣ ≥ δ3κn ∧ B′′ ∪ B′) ≤ e− 12 δ3κ arcsinh ( δ32g(δ′2))n .
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Assume δ′2 small enough, as a function of δ3, such that the right-hand side is less than 2
−(C+1)κn. Assume
further that δ3 + γ/κ ≤ η. Let B′′′ = B′′ ∪ B′ ∩ B. Then it follows as in (63), (65) that
∑
m∈G
∑
t
Pr(T = t)
(
∑
k:(t,m,k)∈B′′′
√
Pr
(
(M, K) = (m, k)|T = t))2 ≤ 2−κn . (67)
Combining (63), (65) and (67) with the triangle inequality proves the lemma.
Recall the definition of the states |φctok〉 in (58). For a parameter η > 0 and any t ∈ {0, 1}N let
|φ˜cto〉 = ∑
k:|k|≤ηκqN
|φctok〉 , (68)
and φ˜cto the sub-normalized density obtained by taking the partial trace of |φ˜cto〉 over register E.
Corollary 8.4. Let D = (φ, Π, M, K) be a simplified device such that condition (55) from Proposition 7.4
holds. Then for any 0 < γ, κ, η < 1 such that γ≪ κ3/2 and κ ≪ η2,
∑
g,c∈{0,1}N
q(g, c) ∑
t∈{0,1}N−|g|
κ(t) ∑
o: (g,c,o)∈ACC
∥∥φco − φ˜cto∥∥
1
= O
(
2−κqN
)
. (69)
Proof. We apply Lemma 8.1. Fix g, c ∈ {0, 1}N , let n = |{i : ci = 0}| and let M and K be distributed as
the measurement outcomes associated with the measurements {Id−M0, Id−M1} and {K0, K1} made by
the device in those rounds i ∈ {0, . . . , N} such that ci = 0. Using (55) from Proposition 7.4 it follows that
these random variables satisfy the assumptions of Lemma 8.1 for a choice of the function g(x) = C
√
x, for
a large enough constant C. The conclusion (60) of the lemma gives (69).
We conclude with a lemma that relates the randomness in the states φ˜cto to randomness in the states
φ˜ctok, for k such that |k| ≤ ηκqN, as these are the post-measurement states associated with the simplified
device in Protocol 2. The lemma relies on the following variant of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Lemma 8.5. Let ℓ ≥ 1 be an integer and |v1〉, . . . , |vℓ〉 arbitrary vectors in Cd. Then( ℓ
∑
i=1
|vi〉
)( ℓ
∑
i=1
|vi〉
)†
≤ ℓ
ℓ
∑
i=1
|vi〉〈vi| .
Using the lemma, we show the following.
Lemma 8.6. Let D = (φ, Π, M, K) be a simplified device, and φ˜cto the ensemble of states associated with
D as described in (68). Then
∑
g,c∈{0,1}N
q(g, c) ∑
t∈{0,1}N−|g|
|t|≤2κqN
κ(t) ∑
o: (g,c,o)∈ACC
〈
φ˜cto
〉
1+ε
≤ 2O(H(η))κqN ∑
g,c∈{0,1}N
q(g, c) ∑
t∈{0,1}N−|g|
κ(t) ∑
o,k: (g,c,t,o,k)∈ACC2
〈
φctok
〉
1+ε
,
where ACC2 denotes the set of transcripts that are accepted by the verifier in Protocol 2.
Proof. The proposition follows from the definition of φ˜cto, Lemma 8.5, and the fact that for any t such that
|t| ≤ 2κqN there are at most 2O(H(η))κqN sequences k ∈ {0, 1}|t| such that |k| ≤ ηκqN. Note that the
conditions that (g, c, o) ∈ ACC and |k| ≤ ηκqN imply (g, c, t, o, k) ∈ ACC2.
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8.2 Randomness accumulation in the simplified protocol
In this section we consider the behavior of a simplified device D = (φ, Π, M, K) in a single round of
Protocol 2. The following lemma shows that, provided the device has overlap ∆(D) bounded away from 1,
then if the state φ of the device has high overlap with the projection operator M1, performing a measurement
of {Π0, Π1, Π2} on φ necessarily perturbs the state (hence generates randomness). The proof is based on
a “measurement-disturbance trade-off” from [MS14], itself a consequence of uniform convexity for certain
matrix p-norms.
Lemma 8.7. Let D = (φ, Π, M, K) be a simplified device with overlap ∆(D) ≤ ω, for some ω < 1. Let
0 ≤ ε ≤ 12 and
t =
〈φG〉1+ε
〈φ〉1+ε , where G =
1
2
(
Π0 + Π1
)
+
1
2
M1K0 and φG =
√
Gφ
√
G . (70)
Then
〈φ01〉1+ε + 〈φ11〉1+ε + 〈φ21〉1+ε
〈φ〉1+ε ≤ 2
−ελω(t) + O(ε2) ,
where the post-measurement states φv1 , v ∈ {0, 1, 2}, are introduced in (46), and
λω(t) = 2 log(e)
(
t− 1
2
− ω
2
)2
(71)
if t ≥ 12 + ω2 , and 0 otherwise.
Proof. The proof uses ideas from [MS14]. Let φ be as in the lemma and φ′ = ∑v ΠvφΠv. Then〈
∑
v
√
GΠvφΠv
√
G
〉
1+ε
≤ ∑
v
〈φ1/2ΠvGΠvφ1/2〉1+ε +O(ε)
≤
(1
2
+
ω
2
)
〈φ1/2(Π0 + Π1)φ1/2〉1+ε + 1
2
〈φ1/2Π2φ1/2〉1+ε + O(ε)
≤
(1
2
+
ω
2
)
〈φ′〉1+ε + O(ε) ,
where the first and last lines use the approximate linearity relations (8), and the second line uses the definition
of K and G ≤ Id. This allows us to proceed as in the proof of [MS14, Theorem 6.3] to obtain
〈φ− φ′〉1+ε ≥ 2
(
t− 1
2
− ω
2
)
〈φ〉1+ε −O(ε) ,
and conclude by applying [MS16, Proposition 5.3].
Using Lemma 8.7 we proceed to quantify the accumulation of randomness across multiple rounds of
the simplified protocol, when it is executed with a simplified device that has overlap bounded away from 1.
The following proposition provides a measure of the randomness present in the transcript, conditioned on
the verifier not aborting the protocol at the end, i.e. on (g, c, t, o, k) ∈ ACC2. (To see the connection with
entropy, recall the definition of the (1 + ε) conditional Re´nyi entropy in Definition 2.9. The connection will
be made precise in Section 8.3.)
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Proposition 8.8. Let D = (φ, Π, M, K) be a simplified device such that ∆(D) ≤ ω for some ω < 1. Let
0 < ε ≤ 12 . Let γ, η, κ, q > 0 and N an integer be parameters for an execution of Protocol 2 (Figure 2)
with D. Then
− 1
εN
log
(∑(g,c,t,o,k)∈ACC2 q(g, c)κ(t) 〈φctok〉1+ε
〈φ〉1+ε
)
≥ λω
(
1− γ
κ
− η
)
−O
(
q +
ε
κq
)
, (72)
where the states φctok are introduced in Definition 6.6, λω is the function defined in (71), and q(g, c) and
κ(t) are the distributions on N-bit strings (g, c) and t as selected by the verifier in Protocol 2.
Proof. Let t = 〈φG〉1+ε〈φ〉1+ε be as defined in Lemma 8.7. Recall the notation for the post-measurement states
introduced in (46). After one round of Protocol 2 is executed, the post-measurement state of the device
can be decomposed into three components. First, in case Gi = 1, which happens with probability (1− q),
the round is a generation round. The randomness generated in such a round is captured by the bound from
Lemma 8.7,
(1− q)(〈φ01〉1+ε + 〈φ11〉1+ε + 〈φ21〉1+ε) ≤ (1− q)(1− ln(2)ελω(t) +O(ε2))〈φ〉1+ε . (73)
The second case corresponds to Gi = 0, which happens with probability q. In this case, for reasons that will
become clear later in this proof we weigh the “success” and “failure” components of the post-measurement
state differently. For the “failure” part we simply write
q
2
(
(1− κ)〈φ000〉1+ε + κ〈φ0001〉1+ε + κ〈φ0101〉1+ε + κ〈φ1101〉1+ε + 〈φ21〉1+ε
)
. (74)
For the “success” part we add a weight of 2
εs
κq , where s = O(1) is a real parameter to be determined later, to
the cases where Ti = 1:
(1− κ)q
2
(〈φ100〉1+ε + 〈φ01〉1+ε + 〈φ11〉1+ε)+ κq2 2 εsκq (〈φ1001〉1+ε + 〈φ01〉1+ε + 〈φ11〉1+ε)
≤ (1− κ)q
2
(〈φ100〉1+ε + 〈φ01〉1+ε + 〈φ11〉1+ε)+ κq(1 + ln(2) εsκq + O( ε2κ2q2)) t 〈φ〉1+ε ,
(75)
where the inequality follows from the definition of t. Using the first inequality in (8) and regrouping terms,
the sum of the left-hand sides of (73), (74) and (80) is at most
(73) + (74) + (80) ≤
(
1− ε ln(2)
(
λω(t)− st + O
(
q +
ε
κq
))
〈φ〉1+ε . (76)
A convenient choice of s is to take the derivative s = λ′ω(r) for some r ∈ [0, 1] to be determined. With this
choice, using that λω is convex it follows that mint∈[0,1] λω(t) − st = λω(r) − λ′ω(r)r. By chaining the
inequality (76) N times, where at each step the density φ is updated with the one obtained from the previous
round, and using that ACC2 contains those sequences (g, c, t, o, k) such that the number of occurrences of
(c, t, o, k) ∈ {(0, 1, 1, 0), (1, ∗, 0, ∗), (1, ∗, 1, ∗)} is at least (1− γ/κ − η)κqN we obtain
− 1
εN
log
(∑(g,c,t,o,k)∈ACC2 q(g, c)κ(t) 〈φctok〉1+ε
〈φ〉1+ε
)
≥ (λω(r)− λ′ω(r)r) +
(
1− γ
κ
− η)λ′ω(r)
−O
(
q +
ε
κq
)
,
with the term (1 − γκ − η)λ′ω(r) on the right-hand side correcting for the weights 2
εs
κq that would appear
on the left-hand side with an exponent derived from the acceptance criterion. Choosing r = (1− γκ − η)
completes the proof.
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8.3 Randomness accumulation in the general protocol
In this section we combine the results obtained in the previous two sections to analyze the randomness
generated in Protocol 1. The main step is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 8.9. Let D = (φ, Π, M) be an efficient device. Let |φ〉DE denote an arbitrary purification of
φD, and ρCOE the joint state of the verifier’s choice of challenges, the outputs computed by the verifier, and
the adversary’s system E, restricted to transcripts that are accepted by the verifier in the protocol.10 Then
there is a δ′ = 2−Ω(γ2/3qN) and a constant C > 0 such that for any δ > 0,
1
N
Hδ+δ
′
∞ (O|CE)ρ ≥ λω
(
1− Cγ1/3)−O(q + γ1/6 + 1 + log(2/δ)
γ5/6qN
)
. (77)
Proof. Let D˜ = (φ, Π˜, M˜, K) be the elementary device obtained by applying Proposition 7.4 to the device
D, for a choice of ω = 34 . Let φ˜ = φ
1
1+ε , where ε > 0 is a small parameter to be specified later. We apply
Proposition 8.8 to D˜, with φ replaced by φ˜. Then (72) gives
− 1
εN
log
(∑(g,c,t,o,k)∈ACC2 q(g, c)κ(t) 〈φ˜ctok〉1+ε
〈φ˜〉1+ε
)
≥ λω
(
1− γ
κ
− η
)
−O
(
q +
ε
κq
)
. (78)
Next we apply Lemma 8.6 to obtain
− 1
εN
log
(∑(g,c,t,o):(g,c,o)∈ACC q(g, c)κ(t) 〈φ˜cto〉1+ε
〈φ˜〉1+ε
)
≥ λω
(
1− γ
κ
− η
)
−O
(
H(η)κ
q
ε
+ q +
ε
κq
)
,
(79)
where the correction H(η)κ qε comes from the exponential prefactor in the bound from Lemma 8.6. The
left-hand side of the bound in Lemma 8.6 only considers those sequences such that |t| ≤ 2κqN, but adding
those sequences back only incurs a negligible error 2−Ω(κqN) (inside the logarithm), due to the Chernoff
bound.
We make one ultimate re-writing step. For any fixed t, the post-measurement state φ˜cto can be expressed
as
PN · · · P1φ˜P1 · · · PN ,
where Pi is the measurement operator associated with challenge ci and outcome oi. Using 〈XX∗〉1+ε =
〈X∗X〉1+ε for any X, and recalling the definition of φ˜ = φ 11+ε ,
〈PN · · · P1φ˜P1 · · · PN〉1+ε = 〈φ
−ε
2(1+ε)φ
1
2 P1 · · · P2N · · · P1φ
1
2φ
−ε
2(1+ε) 〉1+ε .
Introduce a sub-normalized density
ρcto
E
= φ
1
2 P1 · · · P2N · · · P1φ
1
2 ,
that corresponds to the post-measurement state of register E (recall we assumed a purification |φ〉DE of φ)
at the end of Protocol 1, for a given transcript (c, o) for the interaction.
We are in a position to apply Theorem 2.12, with
ρo
CTOE
= ∑
(g,c,t): (g,c,o)∈ACC
q(g, c)κ(t) |c, t〉〈c, t|CT ⊗ |o〉〈o|O ⊗ ρctoE ,
10The state ρ is sub-normalized.
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and σCTE = ∑(g,c,t) q(g, c)κ(t)|c, t〉〈c, t| ⊗ φ. Applying the theorem and using (79) and 〈φ˜〉1+ε = 1 by
definition, we get that for any δ > 0,
1
N
Hδ∞(O|CTE)ρ ≥ λω
(
1− γ
κ
− η)−O(H(η)κ q
ε
+ q +
ε
κq
)
− 1 + 2 log(1/δ)
εN
. (80)
Using that the bound in (77) only considers registers C and O (the transcript) and E, by Corollary 8.4 for
any choice of parameters κ, η such that κ ≪ η2 and κ3/2 ≫ γ, the bound (80) extends to a lower bound on
the entropy Hδ+δ
′
∞ (O|CE)ρ at the cost of an additional δ′ = O(2−κqN) in the smoothing parameter.
Choose κ, η to be sufficiently large constant multiples of γ2/3 and γ1/3 respectively, so that the con-
straints κ ≪ η2 and κ3/2 ≫ γ are satisfied. Let ε to be a sufficiently small constant multiple of γ5/6q. With
this choice of parameters, the term in the O(·) on the right-hand side of (80) is O(q + γ1/6).
Making an appropriate choice of parameters q,γ for an execution of Protocol 1, Proposition 8.9 gives
our main result.
Theorem 8.10. Let F be an NTCF family and λ a security parameter. Let N be a polynomially bounded
function of λ such that N = Ω(λ2). Set q = λ/N. Then there is a δ = 2−Ω(γqN) such that for any small
enough γ > 0, any efficient prover, and side information E correlated with the prover’s initial state,
HNδ∞ (O|CE)ρ ≥ (ξ −O(γ1/6))N ,
where ρ is the final state of the output, challenge, and adversary registers, restricted to transcripts that are
accepted by the verifier in the protocol and ξ is a positive constant.11
Assume that an execution of GEN(1λ) requires O(λr) bits of randomness, for some constant r. (For
example, for the case of our construction of a NTCF family based on LWE, we have r = 2.) Then an execu-
tion of the protocol using the parameters in Theorem 8.10 requires only poly(λ, log N) bits of randomness
for the verifier to generate the key k and select the challenges. Taking N to be slightly sub-exponential in λ,
e.g. N = 2
√
λ, yields sub-exponential randomness expansion.
Proof of Theorem 8.10. Let D be a device that is accepted with non-negligible probability in Protocol 1,
where the parameters are a stated in the theorem. Applying Proposition 8.9 to D and choosing δ to be a
negligible function of N such that δ−1 is sub-exponential gives the result.
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